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Preventing State Budget Crises:
Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem
David Gamagef
State governments have been on a fiscal rollercoaster in recent years. The
mild recession of the early 1990s-which created budget crises in many
states-was followed by strong growth during the later part of the decade.
States used their then-overflowing coffers to pass numerous tax cuts while
increasing funding for a variety of government programs. Yet the bursting of
the tech bubble in 2001 brought about a new round of budgetary emergencies,
this time of even larger magnitude.' "By January 2003, combined state budget
gaps were estimated at $75 to $80 billion, or 14.5 to 18 percent of total state
spending." 2
Boom and bust cycles are a fact of modem economic life. States regained
their budgetary confidence during the brief economic boom of the mid-2000s.
Now, as if by d6ji vu, states face yet another round of budget crises as a result
of the most recent recession.3
Copyright C 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
t Assistant Professor, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall).
Many thanks to Michael Abramowicz, Bruce Ackerman, Anne Alstott, Alan Auerbach, Ian Ayres,
Robert Bartlett, Lily Batchelder, Mitch Berman, Neil Buchanan, Terry Chorvat, Mechele
Dickerson, Michael Doran, Elizabeth Garrett, Mark Gergen, James Hines, Jonathan Klick, Kinch
Hoekstra, Calvin Johnson, Amy Kapczynski, Louis Kaplow, Michael Knoll, Kyle Logue, Dan
Markovits, Ed McCaffery, Melissa Murray, Leslie Papke, Bob Peroni, Eric Rakowski, Chris
Sanchirico, Larry Sager, Alvaro Santos, Jason Schultz, Darien Shanske, Dan Shaviro, Kirk Stark,
Nancy Staudt, Eric Talley, Molly Van Houweling, and the other participants in the Penn Law Tax
Policy Colloquium, the Junior Tax Scholars Workshop, the Law and Society Conference, the
National Tax Association Annual Conference, and the faculty workshops at the Berkeley, Emory,
George Washington, Harvard, Illinois, Northwestern, Santa Clara, Texas, USC, and Yale law
schools.
1. Jaime Calleja Alderete, Tracy Gordon & Jon Sonstelie, Much Ado About Nothing?: Tax
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2.

Id. at 1.

3.
See DONALD J. BOYD & Lucy DADAYAN, THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF
GOv'T, ST. REVENUE REP. No. 76, STATE TAX DECLINE IN EARLY 2009 WAS THE SHARPEST ON

RECORD 1 (2009), http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government-finance/state revenuereport/200907-17-SRR 76.pdf.
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As a general rule, any given set of tax rates generates less revenue during
recessions and more during periods of growth. Consequently, when
governments face balanced-budget constraints (limits on their ability to incur
deficits), economic cycles produce fiscal volatility.4 The governments must
enact tax-rate hikes, spending cuts, or both during downturns, while turning to
some combination of tax-rate cuts and spending increases during upturns.5
This Article analyzes how states should cope with fiscal volatility on both
the levels of "ordinary politics" and "institutional-design policy."6 On the level
of ordinary politics, this Article asks: How should states adjust their tax and
spending policies as their economies cycle? Alternatively, which is more
harmful as a response to fiscal volatility, tax-rate adjustments or spending
fluctuations? On the level of institutional-design policy, this Article asks: How
should states structure their budgetary institutions and procedures so as to
improve the way the ordinary political process manages fiscal volatility?7
On both levels, this Article operates in the realm of the second-best.8
Ideally, states would employ first-best measures for reducing the magnitude of
fiscal volatility. However, states are unlikely to implement first-best
measures-such as weakening balanced-budget constraints or adopting
rainy-day funds9--to the degree necessary to solve state fiscal-volatility
4. This Article uses the term "balanced-budget constraints" to refer to informal forces that
lead states to balance their budgets in addition to the formal legal rules that require states to do so.
For further discussion on the nature of state balanced-budget constraints, see infra Part I.B.
5. Fiscal volatility dilemmas have troubled U.S. cities and states, as well as many foreign
nations. There is even reason to think the U.S. federal government might face fiscal volatility
problems at some point in the future (see infra Part I.D.). Although this Article will briefly
consider how fiscal volatility plays out at other levels of government, and although most of the
Article's prescriptions apply to other government levels, the Article's primary concern is how
U.S. state governments should respond to the fiscal volatility created by their balanced-budget
constraints.
6. The distinction between ordinary politics and institutional-design policy is drawn from
the writings of public choice scholars like James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. See generally
Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF EcoNoMics ONLINE,

http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_ P000240. Public choice scholars
typically use the term "constitutional politics" in place of "institutional-design policy," but I avoid
this phrase as legal audiences sometimes associate "constitutional" rules as necessarily being part
of an actual written constitution.
7. The distinction between ordinary politics and institutional-design policy captures two
different modes in which academics might be called on to give policy advice. "Ordinary politics"
refers to when policymakers ask academics how they should respond to a given problem at a
specific point in time. During an economic downturn, the ordinary politics question usually
involves policymakers asking academics for advice on how to raise additional revenues or cut
spending while causing the least economic harm. In contrast, "institutional-design policy" refers
to when policymakers ask academics how to reform budgetary institutions and procedures so as to
improve the decisions made by future policymakers.
8. In the context of this Article, measures for reducing the harmful consequences of fiscal
volatility are considered "second-best" as compared to "first-best" measures for eliminating fiscal
volatility. If fiscal volatility could be completely eliminated, there would be no need for secondbest coping measures such as those this Article proposes.
9. See infra Part I.C for a definition and discussion of rainy-day funds.
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problems. Indeed, the magnitude of the fiscal volatility created by economic
cycles has been growing over time. While we should certainly strive to eliminate this volatility to the extent we can reasonably do so, the question of how
to cope with the remaining volatility will continue to be a pressing problem.
To consider this problem first on the level of ordinary politics, economists
typically agree that unstable tax policies-such as fluctuating tax rates-are
economically harmful. This accepted wisdom dates back to Adam Smith, who
wrote that the "certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a
matter of so great importance that a very considerable degree of inequality ...
is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty."' 0 Policy
advocacy organizations and the popular press and have adopted this notion to
some degree, and often chide politicians for changing tax laws too frequently,
even when these changes are made to cope with economic cycles.' However,
there is essentially no existing literature comparing instability in tax policies to
instability in spending policies.12 This Article remedies this deficiency in the
literature by comparing the relative harm of managing fiscal volatility either
through tax-rate adjustments or through spending fluctuations.
Drawing on principles from risk-allocation theory, this Article concludes
that states should primarily deal with fiscal volatility by adjusting the rates of
broad-based taxes (such as sales taxes, income taxes, and property taxes).13 As
compared to fluctuating state-government spending, adjusting tax rates can
accomplish greater risk spreading and thereby better mitigate the harmful
effects of fiscal volatility. Broad-based tax-rate adjustments accomplish greater
risk spreading for three reasons. First, state tax and spending policies are
redistributive on the margin, and wealthy taxpayers can absorb the harmful
consequences of risk and uncertainty more efficiently than can the less wealthy
beneficiaries of state spending programs. Second, because revenue volatility is
10.

ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 351 (University of Chicago Press 1976)

(1776).
11.
See, e.g., TAXING SIMPLY: TAXING FAIRLY, FULL REPORT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA TAX COMMISSION 132, availableat http://www.ntanet.org/dctax/dcstudy.htm ("One of

the longstanding principles of taxation is that taxes should be certain and made clearly known to
the taxpayers"); ARTHUR P. HALL, TAX FOUND. SPECIAL REP. No. 41, THE COST OF UNSTABLE
TAX LAWS 1 (1994).

12. A notable exception is: Jesse Edgerton, Andrew Haughwout & Rae Rosen, Institutions,
Tax Structure and State-local Fiscal Distress, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 147 (2004). However, Edgerton
and his co-authors only discuss the macroeconomic stimulatory consequences of fluctuating

spending as compared to fluctuating tax rates; they do not discuss the microeconomic riskallocation consequences that are the focus of this Article.
13. The term "broad-based taxes" refers to tax instruments that reach the majority of state
economic activity. In contrast, "narrow-based taxes" reach a much smaller portion of state
economic activity. For instance, cigarette taxes are much narrower in base than retail sales taxes,
as cigarette taxes cover only tobacco-related sales while retail sales taxes also cover non-tobaccorelated sales. Income taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes are probably the broadest-based of the
commonly used state tax instruments. However, the bases of these tax instruments are broader in

some states than in others, depending on the level of built-in exemptions, credits, and other
preferences.
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more than twice as severe as economic volatility, tax-rate adjustments are
needed to prevent the harmful effects of fiscal volatility from being unduly
concentrated in state spending programs. Finally, legal and political constraints
thwart public administrators from efficiently mitigating the harm that results
from fiscal volatility, whereas private-sector managers are less constrained.
Consequently, the least harmful method for coping with fiscal volatility is to
adjust the rates of broad-based taxes.
However, the trend in recent years has been for states to adjust anything
other than the rates of broad-based taxes. Moreover, it is doubtful whether any
scholarly argument can change this result-at least within the realm of ordinary
politics. This Article thus seeks to disentangle the question of how tax and
spending policies should respond to fiscal volatility from the question of what
tax and spending policies should be in their steady states. 14 This Article aims to
convince even those who seek to reduce the steady-state levels of taxes and
spending that volatility around these steady states should be allocated to tax
rates.
Yet ordinary politics never operate within a steady state; actual policy
changes are always made during a specific point of an economic cycle. During
a downturn, it is unrealistic to ask small-government advocates to campaign for
tax-rate hikes rather than for spending cuts. Similarly, during an upturn,
supporters of increased government spending are unlikely to accept tax-rate
cuts in place of additional spending. Even members of these groups who agree
that volatility should be allocated to tax rates are unlikely to distinguish
between fluctuations made due to economic cycles and changes made due to
real steady-state policies. If a small-government advocate accepts tax hikes
during a downturn, how can she insure that those who want increased spending
will return the favor by agreeing to lower the tax rates during the next upturn?
Given these limitations of ordinary politics, this Article also discusses the
fiscal volatility problem on the level of institutional-design policy. The key to
this level of analysis is how we define terms like "tax cuts" and "tax hikes."
These labels are among the most potent phrases in the American political
lexicon. Even before the ascendancy of the modem conservative movement,
politicians were extremely averse to being seen as raising taxes. Today, any
Republican viewed as supporting tax hikes risks a primary challenge sponsored
by groups like the Club for Growth.' 5 Similarly, many Democrats strive to
deflect the charge of "tax and spend liberal.", 6 Yet despite the political salience
14. In reference to tax and spending policies, the term "steady states" refers to the average
settings of these policies taken across both boom and bust years.
15. E.g., Stephanie Condon, Club for Growth Opposes Utah GOP Sen. Bob Bennett's ReElection, CBS NEWS POLITICAL HOTSHEET, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2010/
01/08/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry6073174.shtml (reporting on examples of "the anti-tax group
Club for Growth['s] . . . trend of backing conservative candidates over more traditional
Republican politicians").
16. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, Will the Real Tax-and-Spender Please Tess Up?, N.Y. TIMEs,
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of these labels, we lack a precise theoretical definition for what constitutes a
"tax cut" or a "tax hike." Most crucially for our purposes, these labels only
make sense in reference to a baseline. Without some concept of what the
default tax and spending policies would be in the absence of legislated changes,
we cannot determine whether any proposed legislative action truly constitutes a
"tax cut" or a "tax hike."
Unlike at the federal level, the states' balanced-budget constraints make it
impossible to hold both tax and spending policies constant as the economy
cycles. States are thus unable to use the entirety of their previous year's tax and
spending policies as a baseline. As a result, state income and sales tax systems
use only the prior year's tax rates as their baseline (i.e. the tax rates currently
on the books). In the absence of legislative action, tax rates remain steady
throughout economic cycles while revenues fluctuate. When legislatures raise
tax rates, observers code these changes as "tax hikes" even when overall
revenues are declining due to slowing economic conditions.
Although this institutional-design-level policy choice has not been
critiqued (or even noted), there are alternative baselines that states could choose
in place of tax rates. For instance, the local property tax systems of several
states hold revenue targets constant as their baseline. As the property values
that form the bases for these taxes fluctuate, the default response is to adjust
property tax rates to keep the amount of revenue generated constant. The
localities are only considered to propose "tax hikes" or "tax cuts" when they
call for changes to the revenue targets; the annual tax-rate adjustments are not
labeled as tax hikes or tax cuts unless they result from a legislated raising or
lowering of the revenue targets.
Moreover, tax rates and revenue targets are not the only aspects of fiscal
policy that states might use as a baseline. Consider that the size of many federal
grants to states depends on metrics for how much states need the funding.
Grants of this sort that support poverty assistance programs will thus
automatically grow larger during downturns and smaller during upturns as their
funding metrics show the state populations needing more or less poverty
assistance. We could potentially create a baseline for state-tax rates based on
metrics for spending needs, administratively adjusting the rates to meet the
cyclical funding requirements of programs that cost more during busts than
during booms.
The choice of baselines at the institutional-design level impacts the
outcomes of the ordinary political process. The literature on voter psychology
tells us that preferences for tax and spending policies exhibit a status-quo bias:
voters display an "endowment effect" in regard to fiscal policy and "loss-

June 13, 2008, at A25 (reporting on John McCain calling Obama a "tax-and-spend liberal"),
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/us/politics/13check.htnl.
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aversion" with respect to fiscal policy changes. Furthermore, positive political
theory predicts that it is generally harder to change a default policy than to
prevent such a change (due to the prevalence of veto points within our systems
of checks and balances). Consequently, whatever aspect of fiscal policy we set
as a baseline should tend to fluctuate less as the economy cycles.
Hence, the current trend of allocating the majority of fiscal volatility to
government spending results at least partially from the fact that states use tax
rates as their primary baselines. By replacing these baselines with revenue
targets (or with spending needs), we could make tax-rate adjustments more
common and expenditure fluctuations rarer. State politicians would be less
likely to cut spending during downturns if the alternative did not require voting
for "tax hikes." And if upturns no longer automatically brought massive
revenue growth, politicians would become more reluctant to increase spending.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes the nature of the fiscal
volatility problem in more detail and explains why first-best solutions are
unlikely to solve the problem. Part II examines the problem through the lens of
ordinary politics, evaluating the extent to which fiscal volatility should be dealt
with by fluctuating tax rates or government spending. Part III considers the
problem through the lens of institutional-design policy, discussing the choice of
baselines for defining terms like "tax cuts" and "tax hikes."
I
UNDERSTANDING THE FISCAL VOLATILITY PROBLEM

Before we can determine how states should cope with fiscal volatility, we
must first understand the nature of the fiscal volatility problem. This Part
discusses the impact of state-level fiscal volatility, why states cannot resolve
their fiscal volatility dilemmas directly (either by abandoning their balancedbudget constraints or through other first-best solutions), and how fiscal
volatility problems play out at other levels of government.
A. The Impact of State-Level Fiscal Volatility

To appreciate the impact of the fiscal volatility problem at the state level,
it is worth starting with a few anecdotes. Consider the following excerpts from
a New York Times article written near the end of the 2001-2003 downturn:
At a time when the governor of Missouri has ordered every third
light bulb unscrewed to save money, when teachers are doubling as
janitors in Oklahoma and working two weeks without pay in Oregon,
when Connecticut is laying off prosecutors and Kentucky is releasing
prison inmates early . .. [states] have tapped rainy day funds, raided
tobacco money that was supposed to have provided health care for
children and taxed every possible vice.
17.

I describe the literature on these phenomena in Part III.A.2.
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Last year brought the storm warnings: some layoffs, the
inconveniences of libraries closing early and roads without fresh
asphalt. Now, as states scramble to find ways to cut nearly $100 billion
this year and next from budgets that must by law be balanced, the cuts
are much larger, and their effects profound.
It is not just that states are withdrawing health care for the poor and
mentally ill. They are also dismissing state troopers, closing parks and
schools, dropping bus routes, eliminating college scholarships and
slashing a host of other services that have long been taken for
granted."
Forty-nine of the U.S. states have some form of balanced-budget
requirements. And even the one state that does not-Vermont-has generally
acted as though so bound.2 0 These constraints have created significant fiscal
volatility as the state economies have cycled through booms and busts. In
California, for instance, the standard deviation of state revenues (that is, the
average variation around the overall trend) was 8%between the years 1980 and
2004.21 Average volatility of this magnitude can result in dramatic short-term
shifts in state fiscal positions. Looking again at California, the state's general
fund revenues grew by 20% in 2000, only to fall by 17% in 2002 as the tech
bubble collapsed.22
Most other states shared California's experience, at least to some degree.
According to the Federation of Tax Administrators, "total state revenues fell by
24 percent between the third quarter of 2001 and the second quarter of 2002,
and personal income tax collections plunged by 42.7 percent." 23 As Elaine
Maag and David Merriman explain:
State tax revenues for fiscal 2001, which ended June 2001 in most
18. Timothy Egan, States, FacingBudget Shortfalls, Cut the Major and the Mundane, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at Al.
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., FISCAL DISCIPLINE IN THE
19.
FEDERAL SYSTEM: NATIONAL REFORM AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE STATES 37-38 (1987)

(categorizing the various types of balanced-budget constraints); James M. Poterba, Balanced
Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidencefrom the States, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 329, 330 (1995).

20.

There is actually some controversy as to whether Vermont has a balanced budget

requirement. See, e.g., Yilin Hou, Budgeting for Fiscal Stability over the Business Cycle: A
Countercyclical Fiscal Policy and the Multiyear Perspective on Budgeting, PUB.
ADMINISTRATION REv. 730, 739 n.8 (2007) (claiming that Vermont has a "legal obligation ... to

balance the budget" despite some studies "exclud[ing] Vermont from this category").
Regardless, using the broader definition for "balanced-budget constraints" discussed in Part
IB, infra, Vermont appears to operate under balanced-budget constraints. See, e.g., RICHARD
BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS: THE REALITY OF STATE BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS 3

(1996).
21.
Jon David Vasch6 & Brad Williams, Revenue Volatility in California, 36 ST. TAX
NOTES 35, 37 (2005).
22. Id. at 35.
23.

NAT'L Ass'N OF ST. BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGETING AMID FISCAL UNCERTAINTY:

ENSURING BUDGET STABILITY BY FOCUSING ON THE LONG TERM 7-8 (2004) [hereinafter NASB].
Equivalent data is not yet available for the current downturn that began in 2008.
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states, were almost $30 billion higher than they had been a year earlier.
State tax revenues declined dramatically thereafter. During fiscal 2002,
tax revenues were about $32 billion less than in fiscal 2001. Thus, state
revenues were an unprecedented $62 billion less than they would have
been if revenue growth had matched the previous year. It is not
surprising that these events caught at least some state policymakers
unprepared, and resulted in a major fiscal crisis.24
During upturns, states find themselves flushed with revenues. State
officials use this extra money to expand existing programs, create new ones,
and cut taxes.25 Yet this revenue disappears once the economy enters a
downturn, forcing state officials either to reduce spending or to raise taxes. As
the National Association of State Budget Officers puts it, "No one wants to take
an action one year only to reverse it the next. Yet many state officials did
exactly that during the early 1980s, and again during the early 1990s, repeating
a pattern that is decades old." 26
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to predict when downturns will
occur.27 If policymakers had known in 2000 or in 2007 that downturns were
just around the corner, they might have been more careful with their
temporarily increased funds. But both the tech bust in 2001 and the financial
crisis in 2008 came as surprises. Certainly, there were analysts who predicted
that the internet and real-estate booms were unsustainable. Yet most of these
analysts had been making the same predictions throughout the late 1990s and
mid-2000s while revenues continued to surge. 28 Only with the benefit of
hindsight can we accurately know when a boom will turn into a bust.
The fiscal volatility problem has troubled states at least since they adopted
balanced-budget constraints in response to the debt crises of the nineteenth
century." Nevertheless, the problem has become much worse over the last few
decades. Due largely to the rise of the conservative antitax movement, states
appear to have altered the ways in which they cope with fiscal volatility. Meanwhile, the overall magnitude of fiscal volatility has been increasing over time.
1. How States Cope with Fiscal Volatility
The manner in which states respond to fiscal volatility has shifted
dramatically in recent years. Between World War II and the mid-1970s, state
governments expanded rapidly, with overall state tax burdens rising from 3% of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1950 to 5.5% of GDP in 1975.30
24.

Elaine Maag & David Merriman, Tax Policy Responses to Revenue Shorfalls, 29 ST.

TAX NOTES 363, 363-64 (2003) (emphasis omitted).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

NASB, supra note 23, at 7.
Id.
Vasch6 & Williams, supra note 21, at 40; NASB, supra note 23, at 7-8.
See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
See infra note 63-66 and accompanying text.
J. Fred Giertz & Seth H. Giertz, The 2002 Downturn in State Revenues: A Comparative
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Consequently, during the four recessions between 1952 and 1973, the overall
trend of increasing revenues largely overshadowed the cyclical fluctuations of
state finances; although the recessions of this period resulted in slowed growth,
state tax revenues never declined on a year-to-year basis.' As it is much easier
to delay spending increases than to actually cut programs, fiscal volatility
during this period was a relatively minor problem.
This rosy picture began to change in the mid-1970s. The growth of state
governments halted after 1975, with state tax revenues oscillating around 5.5%
of GDP from 1975 through 2008.32 With state expenditures no longer growing
as a percentage of the states' economies, the recessions in this period have
created significant fiscal distress for state and local governments.3 3
This stabilization of state tax levels coincided with the rise of the
conservative antitax movement. 34 The late 1970s brought the first major
antiproperty tax measure in California's Proposition 13. Soon after, Ronald
Reagan successfully won the presidency campaigning for smaller government.
Today, numerous Republicans and even some Democrats have signed the No
New Taxes Pledge, committing them to "oppose any and all efforts to increase
the marginal income tax rates for individuals and/or businesses."3 The Pledge
makes no exceptions for cyclical tax hikes meant to cope with fiscal

volatility.3 6
The growing power of the antitax movement has considerably altered how
states manage fiscal downturns. During the recession of the early 1990s, state
governments responded with a roughly equal mixture of tax hikes and spending
cuts.37 As the economy rebounded in the second half of that decade, the states
Review and Analysis, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 111, 114 (2004).
3 1. Id.
32. Id. Note that state governments only stopped growing as a percentage of state GDPs; in
both real and nominal dollar values, state governments continued growing along with the privatesector portions of states' economies.
33. Richard F. Dye & David F. Merriman, Understanding State Government Budget
Problems: Insights from the Midwest Region, 34 ST. TAX NOTES 233, 240 (2004) ("[E]ach
recession since at least 1970 has been accompanied by significant state and local government
fiscal distress.").
34.

See ROBERT W. SMITH & THOMAS D. LYNCH, PUBLIC BUDGETING IN AMERICA (5th ed.

2004); Fred Block, Read Their Lips: Taxation and the Right-Wing Agenda, in THE NEW FISCAL
SOcIOLOGY 68 (Isaac William Martin, Ajay K. Mehrortra & Monica Prasad eds., 2009). The rise
of the antitax movement was undoubtedly at least a partial cause of the stabilization of state tax
revenues.
35. William G. Gale & Brennan Kelly, The "No New Taxes" Pledge, 104 TAX NOTES 197,
198 (2004).
, pledge to the taxpayers of the
36. See id. The pledge, in its entirety, states: "I,_
district of the state of

,

and to the American people that I will: ONE,

oppose any and all efforts to increase the marginal income tax rates for individuals and/or
businesses; and TWO, oppose any net reduction or elimination of deductions and credits, unless
matched dollar for dollar by further reducing tax rates." Id.
37.
ROBERT ZAHRADNIK, IRIS J. LAv & ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES,

FRAMING

THE

CHOICES

1

(2005),

http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-9-05sfpl.pdf
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returned to lowering taxes and increasing spending. Yet during the 2001-2003
downturn, state governments relied three times as much on spending cuts as on
tax and fee increases-with fee increases being more prevalent than tax hikes.38
Many of the governors and legislators who supported raising taxes as a
means of coping with the 1990s recession were punished in subsequent
elections.39 Common wisdom now holds that politicians sponsor tax hikes at
their own peril, even when the only alternative is to cut spending. A number of
states have gone so far as to enact tax-expenditure limits, which prohibit state
legislatures from raising taxes--or impose super-majority requirements for
doing so-even as a response to cyclical downturns.40 Some state governments
still find it politically feasible to raise license and user fees, to broaden tax
bases, to create lotteries, and to hike "sin" taxes (especially cigarette taxes).4 1
But even in the most liberal of states, the rates of broad-based taxes are now
raised only as a last resort.42 Consequently, spending cuts have become the
primary response to fiscal downturns and this trend seems likely to continue for
the foreseeable future.
The composition of state budgets necessitates that these spending cuts
affect even the most popular of programs. Indeed, during 2003, thirty-two
states enacted across-the-board spending cuts. 4 3 Despite the strong public
support for education spending, elementary and secondary education
[hereinafter FRAMING THE CHOICES]. Note that these figures define tax hikes as increases in the
statutory tax rates and spending cuts as reductions from projected spending. Nominal spending
totals (as opposed to real totals or spending as a percent of GDP) were not cut.
38. Id. ("[S]tates were three times more likely to rely on spending cuts to close deficits than
on revenue increases."); see also Irene Rubin, The State of State Budget Research, PUB.

BUDGETING & FIN., Dec. 2005 Silver Anniversary Ed., at 46, 49 (2005) ("One conclusion from
this research is that states that used to use both revenue increases and spending decreases to close
gaps have in recent years ruled out tax increases, leading nearly exclusively to spending
reductions.").
At the time of this writing, it is still too soon to know how states will respond to the current
downturn that began in 2008. But early reports suggest that spending cuts continue to dominate
tax hikes as the preferred coping strategy. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, NEW FISCAL
YEAR BRINGS PAINFUL SPENDING CUTS, CONTINUED BUDGET GAPS IN ALMOST EVERY STATE

(2009), availableat http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfn?fa=view&id=2853.
39. Maag & Merriman, supra note 24, at 371-72.
40. Id. at 372; Iris J. Lay, Elizabeth C. McNichol & Robert Zahradnik, FaultyFoundations:
State StructuralBudget Problems andHow to Fix Them, 37 ST. TAX NOTES 43, 75-77 (2001).
41. See generally Nicholas W. Jenny & James Orsi, Budget Balancing Tactics, 3 THE
ROCKEFELLER INST. ST. FISCAL NEWS No. 7 (2003) (describing the politically feasible

mechanisms for states to raise revenue in a downturn).
42. Consider the 2006 budget crisis in New Jersey, at a time when Democrats controlled
the governor's mansion and both legislative chambers. The governor's proposed solution to the
state's budget crises was to be funded: 50% by spending cuts, 25% by license and user fees, and
only 25% by raising the state's sales tax rate from 6% to 7%. Yet where the first two components
of the budget proposal were relatively non-controversial, the legislature refused to enact the salestax hike, which led to the government being shut down in an act of brinkmanship. See Richard G.
Jones, Corzine Shuts Down New Jersey's Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2006, available at

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9BO4E2D81530F932A35754COA9609C8B63.
43. NASB, supra note 23, at 6.
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constitutes too large a portion of state general account budgets, at 35% of
spending," to be spared from cuts. Nevertheless, cuts tend to target some
spending areas more than others, hitting higher education, at 11% of spending,
45
and Medicaid, at 21% of spending, particularly hard. As a result, average
tuition fees at public universities increased by 35% between 2000 and 2004
after adjusting for inflation, while over one million residents lost their
eligibility for state-assisted health insurance.47
2. Why Fiscal Volatility Is Growing Over Time

Not only are states finding it harder to cope with fiscal volatility now that
the continued growth of state governments has halted, but the overall
magnitude of fiscal volatility has been increasing over time. The two main
reasons for this growth in fiscal volatility are changes in state tax bases and
changes in state spending baselines.4 8
The first major cause of increased fiscal volatility results from tax
revenues becoming more volatile due to changes in state tax bases. Different
forms of taxation can be more or less volatile. Where property tax revenues
remain relatively stable as the economy cycles, sales tax revenues are quite
volatile, and income tax revenues fluctuate even more wildly.49 Yet over the
past fifty years, states have gradually reduced their reliance on property taxes in
favor of sales and income taxes, thereby increasing the magnitude of fiscal
volatility.50 Moreover, the volatility of state income taxes has significantly
expanded in recent years, presumably due to greater income stratification. 5'

44.

NAT'L Ass'N OF ST. BUDGET OFFICERS, 2003 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 5 (2004)

[hereinafter 2003 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT]. For examples of the impact of these cuts, see
generally Dale Russakoff & Linda Perlstein, States Cutting School Funding;Officials Predict Toll
on Students and Bush's Goals, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2003, at Al.
45. See 2003 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT, supra note 44, at 5. Note that Medicaid

spending is sometimes only cut relative to previously authorized expenditures. The general trend
of rapid growth in Medicaid spending over time may overpower cuts in previously authorized
expenditures during downturns. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
46.
ELIZABETH C. MCNICHOL & IRIS J. LAV, CTR. ON BUDGET & PoL'Y PRIORITIES, STATE
REVENUES

AND

SERVICES

REMAIN

BELOW

PRE-RECESSION

LEVELS

4

(2005),

http://www.cbpp.org/files/12-6-05sfp2.pdf.
47.

FRAMING THE CHOICES, supra note 37, at 5.

48.

Federal government policies have also contributed to increased fiscal volatility at the

state level. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2562-613

(2005).
49.

John Matthews, Tax Revenue Volatility and a Statewide Education Sales Tax, 38 ST.

TAX NOTES 305, 305-07 (2005); see also Roger E. Brinner, Joyce Brinner, Matt Eckhouse &
Megan Leahey, FiscalRealitiesfor the State and Local Governments: What You Don't Know Will
Hurt You; What You Can Learn Will Help You, 43 Bus. EcON. 55, 60-62 (2008).

50. Giertz & Giertz, supra note 30, at 114.
51. Vasch6 & Williams, supra note 21, at 42 ("[O]ther factors that have contributed to
volatility in the past-namely, increased reliance on the personal income tax and increasing
concentrations of income at the high end of the income distribution-are more permanent and thus
likely to continue to contribute to volatility in the future.").
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Partially due to these changes in state tax bases, the 2001-2003 downturn
generated much larger revenue shortfalls than did previous recessions, even
52
though the economic effects of the downturn were comparatively mild.
The second major cause of increased fiscal volatility comes from changes
in state spending baselines-most notably due to Medicaid spending.
Medicaid's spending baselines are countercyclical; more state residents
generally qualify for Medicaid during downturns than during periods of
economic growth.53 As such, countercyclical programs like Medicaid
exacerbate fiscal volatility problems by placing greater demands on state
budgets when revenues are scarce and lesser demands when revenues are
plentiful. Driven by rising healthcare costs and changes in federal government
policy, Medicaid grew from 10.8% of state spending in 1989 to 19.6% of state
spending in 2001. Consequently, as revenues began to plummet during the
last downturn, states found that even maintaining their previous levels of nonMedicaid spending would require cutting promised Medicaid benefits.
State-level fiscal volatility is a significant and growing problem. Faced
with balanced-budget constraints, state governments must adjust either their
taxes or their spending as the economy cycles. Yet this discussion of the
problem raises the question why states have balanced-budget constraints in the
first place. At least in theory, states could eliminate most of their fiscal
volatility problems simply by running deficits during downturns and surpluses
once their economies return to growth.
B. The Nature ofState Balanced-BudgetConstraints

In the absence of political considerations, economists generally agree that
governments should run surpluses during booms and deficits during busts.55
Yet balanced-budget constraints make fiscal stimulus of this sort impossible. 5 6
52. Giertz & Giertz, supra note 30, at 115. One reason for the dramatic revenue shortfalls
following the 2001 downturn was the collapse of realized capital gains, a pattern which might not
be repeated in future economic cycles. But the other causes of increased fiscal volatility are likely
to continue.
53. Super, supra note 48, at 2630-32.
54. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, IO8TH CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS app. C at 5-6 (Comm. Print 2004). Note that these figures

refer to total state spending, as opposed to just general account spending (the portion of spending
relevant to balanced-budget constraints). Medicaid spending is slightly smaller as a percentage of
general account spending than of total spending, as some Medicaid spending is financed by
dedicated revenue sources.
55. DANIEL SHAVIRO, Do DEFICITS MATTER? 205-11 (1997); Torben M. Andersen, Is
There a Role for an Active Fiscal Stabilization Policy?, 51 CESwo EcON. STUD. 511 (2005); see

also infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
56.

See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational Justice, and Long-Term Deficits,

58 TAx L. REv. 275, 294 (2005) ("The practical consequences of failing to adjust for the business
cycle are especially severe for state and local governments, most of which operate under
(modified) balanced budget requirements.").
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As a result, state governments are forced to hike taxes or cut spending at
exactly those times when economic theory calls for reduced taxes and higher
spending. Conversely, state governments lower taxes and raise spending just as
their economies start to overheat, thereby magnifying the harmful effects of the
business cycle.
Despite the acknowledged negative consequences of state balancedbudget constraints, there is no significant movement calling for the abolition of
these constraints. Indeed, even though the written balanced-budget
requirements within many states' constitutions lack effective enforcement
mechanisms, the states typically follow them anyway. What explains these
puzzles? The answer has far less to do with economics than with the nature of
the political process.
1. Why States Have Balanced-Budget Constraints

If states were governed by philosopher kings, there would be little need
for balanced-budget constraints. In accordance with traditional Keynesian
economic theory, state governments could accrue deficits during downturns and
pay off the accumulated debt with surpluses generated during upturns.58
Unfortunately, few philosopher kings are elected to public office. As such,
scholars have warned against trusting governments with the power to accrue
deficits as far back as David Hume:
It is very tempting to a minister to employ such an expedient, as
enables him to make a great figure during his administration, without
overburdening his people with taxes, or exciting any immediate
clamors against himself. The practice, therefore, of contracting debt
will almost infallibly be abused, in every government. It would
scarcely be more imprudent to give a prodigal son a credit in every
banker's shop in London, than to empower a statesman to draw bills,
59
in this manner, upon posterity.
Politicians generally benefit both from cutting taxes and from increasing
spending on popular programs. When politicians are not required to pay for
current expenditures with current taxes, they face strong incentives to run up
ever-greater deficits.60 Absent some form of balanced budget constraint,
nothing prevents lawmakers from using deficits to finance structural
imbalances between taxes and spending, rather than limiting deficit use to

57. Arik Levinson, Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the States, 51
NAT. TAX. J. 715 (1998).
58. See Alberto Alesina, The PoliticalEconomy of the Budget Surplus in the United States,

14 J. EcON. PERsP. 3, 3-4 (2000) [hereinafter Alesina, Budget Surplus] (noting the "predictions of
a traditional Keynesian model of fiscal policy").
59.

DAVID HUME, ESSAY ON PUBLIC CREDIT (1752).

60.

See Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini & Filipe R. Campante, Why is FiscalPolicy Often

Procyclical?,6 J. EUR. EcON. Ass'N 1006 (2008).
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coping with downturns. Although accrued debt must eventually be paid off,
politicians can leave this task to the future, when they will presumably no
longer hold office. 62
It was precisely this problem that caused states to adopt balanced-budget
requirements in the nineteenth century. States accrued ever-increasing levels
of debt in order to finance infrastructure projects without raising taxes. After
the national economy tanked in the late 1830s, states found they had stretched
themselves past their limits. Throughout the 1840s, state after state defaulted
on its debts. 65 State governments responded to these debt crises by enacting
66
balanced-budget requirements into state law. Whether as a direct result of
these new formal balanced-budget requirements, or due to the debt crises
fostering an informal norm of budget balancing, the states have largely
refrained from deficit spending since the 1840s.
Underscoring the importance of state balanced-budget constraints, the
incentives for deficit spending might be even stronger today than in the
nineteenth century. 67 The political landscape is currently divided between one
party that seeks to shrink the size of government, and another party that seeks
to increase (or at least maintain) the current level of government spending.
Conservatives may be tempted to pass tax cuts during upturns, even when they
realize the fiscal situation is unsustainable. Through this strategy, known as
"starving the beast," a conservative government can make it harder for
subsequent liberal governments to increase spending.68 Moreover, by
campaigning for tax cuts without specifying which spending programs will
eventually need to be curtailed in order to pay for the tax cuts, conservatives
can take advantage of voter myopia as to the connection between taxes and

61. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of why administratively mandated limits on debt
financing are unlikely to solve the fiscal volatility problem.
62. The incentives for this sort of behavior may be even stronger due to term limits on state
officials.
63. A. JAMES HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT 7 (1963);
BENJAMIN U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 79 (1941); Stewart Sterk & Elizabeth
Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness Of ConstitutionalDebt

Limitations, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1301; John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, Dysfunctional or
Optimal Institutions?: State Debt Limitations, the Structure of State and Local Governments, and
the Finance of American Infrastructure, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 331, 342-49 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth Graddy & Howell E.
Jackson eds., 2008) [hereinafter FISCAL CHALLENGES].
64. Heins, supra note 63, at 7; Ratchford, supra note 63, at 79; Sterk & Goldman, supra
note 63; Wallis & Weingast, supra note 63, at 342-49.
Heins, supra note 63, at 7; Ratchford, supra note 63, at 79; Sterk & Goldman, supra
65.
note 63; Wallis & Weingast, supra note 63, at 342-49.
66.
Heins, supra note 63, at 7; Ratchford, supra note 63, at 79; Sterk & Goldman, supra
note 63; Wallis & Weingast, supra note 63, at 342-49.
67. See Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, Why are StabilizationsDelayed? 81 AM. EcON.
REV. 1170 (1991).
68. Alesina, Budget Surplus, supra note 58, at 14-15.
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spending. 69 As liberals face the opposite incentives-to campaign for deficitfinanced spending increases in order to prevent future conservative
governments from reducing taxes-deficits would likely grow to dangerous
levels in the absence of balanced-budget constraints.70
In essence, each side can benefit from playing chicken. Instead of working
together proactively on a sound fiscal policy, conservatives can push for tax
cuts and liberals for spending increases, until all the slack in the budget has
been used up. Each side hopes the other will give in first-before the state
succumbs to bankruptcy-with conservatives hoping that liberals will
eventually agree to cut spending, and liberals hoping that conservatives will
eventually consent to tax hikes.7 ' But if both sides delay compromise for too
long, the end result may be tragedy.
2. How States Respond to Balanced-Budget Constraints

It is often noted that the written balanced-budget requirements within
many state constitutions lack effective enforcement mechanisms. 72 Even to the
extent states are legally required to match expenditures with revenues, states
can use a variety of "budgetary gimmicks" to create the appearance of balance
without actually adjusting either taxes or spending. For instance, during the
2001-2003 downturn, states played accounting games, raided pension funds,
sold state assets, securitized future revenue streams, and engaged in concealed
borrowing.73 Taken to the extreme, state governments could simply fake their
accounting statements to avoid making painful adjustments during downturns.

69.

Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Starving the Beast: The Political Psychology

ofBudget Deficits, in FISCAL CHALLENGES, supra note 63, at 221. The advantages of campaigning
for tax cuts without specifying which spending programs will be cut can be explained both by the
political psychology literature, as in the Baron and McCaffery article cited above, and by more
traditional public-choice models. When spending reductions are specified, the beneficiaries of the
spending have strong incentives to campaign against tax cuts. When spending cuts are left
unspecified, the beneficiaries of each spending program have only a probabilistic chance of seeing
their benefits cut, and thus have reduced incentives to campaign against the tax cuts as compared
to the known beneficiaries of the tax cuts.
70. This may be currently happening at the federal level. See infra Part I.D.
71. Even if members of either the liberal or conservative coalitions would prefer to limit
spending hikes or tax cuts (respectively) in order to restore slack to the budget, they may refrain
from doing so out of fear that the opposing coalition will simply take advantage of the slack to
advance that coalition's preferred use of revenues.
72.

See, e.g., John E. Petersen, Changing Red to Black: Deficit Closing Alchemy, 56 NAT'L

TAX. J. 567 (2003); State Government Experience with Balanced Budget Requirements:
Relevance to Federal Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 102d Cong. (1992)
(statement of Steven D. Gold, Director of the Center for Study of the States, Nelson A.
Rockefeller Institute of Government, State University of New York).
73. Petersen, supra note 72.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

764

[Vol. 98:749

Despite this, states make only limited use of budgetary gimmicks. 74
During the recession of the early 1990s, for example, budgetary gimmicks were
estimated to have accounted for only 19% of state responses to fiscal volatility;
the remaining 81% was split between tax hikes and spending cuts.75 Similarly,
during the 2001-2003 downturn, these gimmicks were estimated to have
accounted for only 24% of state responses to fiscal volatility. 6 Typically, states
rely heavily on budgetary gimmicks and rainy-day funds during the first year of
a downturn, but then turn to more painful coping measures during subsequent
years, once these easy methods have been exhausted.7
Why don't states make greater use of budgetary gimmicks, or simply
ignore their balanced-budget requirements all together? The literature posits
two distinct answers to this question. First, states may fear the disciplining
power of capital markets. As Richard Briffault argues:
The states lack the fiscal and monetary tools and the tax base of
the federal government. States can neither print money nor close their
borders to prevent residents and businesses from fleeing to other
jurisdictions to avoid high levels of state taxation. In order to borrow, a
state must demonstrate to potential lenders its capacity to repay its
debts. If it persistently ran a significant deficit, its creditworthiness
would be undermined. It would have to pay a substantial penalty in
terms of higher interest rates or, ultimately, risk loss of access to
capital markets. States are like households or businesses. They balance
their budgets not necessarily because their constitutions require itafter all, households and businesses are not subject to constitutional
78
requirements-but because the marketplace demands it.
Second, states may be constrained by norms against running deficits.
According to a survey by the National Association of State Budget Officers:
"[T]he most important factor contributing to balanced budgets is not an
enforcement mechanism or a provision specifying how a shortfall will
be made up. Rather it is the tradition of balancing budgets, the mindset
this tradition creates, and the importance placed on balanced budgets
that result in states complying with their requirements." 79
74. See Levinson, supra note 57, at 717 ("[M]ost state midyear budget gaps appear to be
met by spending decreases or revenue increases, rather than interfund or intertemporal transfers
that would be symptomatic of gimmickry.").
75. Poterba,supra note 19, at 332.
76.

FRAMING THE CHOICES, supra note 37, at 1. The remaining 76% was split between

spending cuts (42%), tax and fee increases (14%), use of rainy-day funds (10%), and federal fiscal
relief (10%). The use of budget gimmicks was much higher than the historical average partly
because states generated significant revenues from one-time securitizations of their future income
from the tobacco litigation settlements. See Maag & Merriman, supra note 24, at 372.
77.

See, e.g., FRAMING THE CHOICEs, supra note 37, at 5-6 (providing examples of painful

coping measures).
78. Briffault, supranote 20, at 5.
79. Id. at 60 (quoting NAT'L Ass'N OF ST. BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE BALANCED BUDGET
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Whether the cause is fear of capital markets, adherence to antideficit
norms, or a combination of these two factors, the fact remains that "most states
balance their budgets most of the time whether or not they are required by their
constitutions to do so."so Although states use budgetary gimmicks as a partial
response to fiscal volatility, states deal with the majority of volatility through a
combination of tax and spending adjustments.
Ultimately, what matters is not whether a state has a balanced budget
requirement written into its constitution, but the extent to which a state's
political community operates under a norm of budget balancing, and the extent
to which financial markets punish departures from this norm. From here on out,
this Article uses the term "balanced-budget constraints" to refer to budgetbalancing norms and financial market discipline, in addition to the effects of
the states' formal balanced-budget requirements. 81
C. The Inadequacy ofFirst-BestSolutions

The bulk of this Article analyzes second-best means for dealing with
fiscal volatility. Assuming that states cannot solve their fiscal volatility
problems directly, they should respond to the volatility so as to minimize its
harmful effects. Yet before proceeding to discuss second-best coping
mechanisms, it is worth spending a little more time evaluating potential firstbest solutions.82

REQUIREMENTS: PROVISIONS AND PRACTICE 3 (1992)); see also Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, A
Framework for Understanding State Balanced Budget Requirement Systems: Reexamining
Distinctive Features and an Operational Definition, 26 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 22, 27 (Sept.

2006) ("[Wle can conclude that both qualitative and empirical studies of state BBRs are grounded
in data that at least partially reflect personal perception, judicial interpretation, and other
nonstatutory and nonconstitutional considerations."). See also infra notes 105-113 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how antideficit norms governed the behavior of the U.S.
federal government for most of the nation's history.
The existence of antideficit norms corresponds with much of the theory behind the new
social-norms scholarship, particularly as developed in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Law and
Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998). For the reasons discussed in

Part I.B.1, these norms are functional and are likely enforced through extralegal means-such as
through voter retaliation against politicians seen as violating the norms.
80. Briffault, supra note 20, at 3.
81. In other words, this Article uses the term "balanced-budget constraints" to refer to
informal forces that lead states to balance their budgets in addition to the formal legal rules that
require states to do so.
82. In addition to the first-best solutions discussed in the text of this Article, states could
adjust their tax bases by replacing volatile income taxes with less volatile alternatives like
property taxes. However, adjusting tax bases in this fashion would have numerous policy
implications that many state legislators (and voters) would consider undesirable. As such, I do not
view adjusting state tax bases as a viable first-best solution. For further discussion of the
limitations to this alternative approach in the context of California, see David Gamage, Managing
California'sFiscalRoller Coaster, 49 ST. TAX NOTES 659, 661 (2008).
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As this Article has discussed, the most direct means for resolving fiscal
volatility-relaxing state balanced-budget constraints-is probably undesirable
due to the nature of the political process.83 But if balanced-budget constraints
prevent states from accruing deficits during downturns, might states adopt the
opposite policy instead? In theory, states could solve their fiscal volatility
problems by saving the surplus revenues generated during upturns and using
these saved revenues to finance spending during downturns.
Most states do indeed save some of their surplus revenues in "rainy-day
funds."84 Yet states fall far short from adequately financing these funds.s For
example, although states invested far more heavily in rainy-day funds during
the 1990s than during any previous boom, these funds still covered less than
one-sixth of the revenue shortfalls during the subsequent bust.
The reason states fail to adequately finance their rainy-day funds is the
same reason states let deficits grow to dangerous levels in the absence of
balanced-budget constraints. Like the decision to forgo deficit spending,
investing in rainy-day funds constitutes a "political gift[] from one period's
policymakers to some unknown successors."8 Politicians can advance both
their personal electoral prospects and their partisan agendas by using surplus
revenues for cutting taxes or increasing spending, rather than saving the
revenues in rainy day funds.88
There is some scholarly discussion of mechanisms for forcing states to
save more of their surplus revenues during economic booms.89 At the most
extreme level, we might imagine an administrative agency requiring surplus
revenues to be invested in rainy day funds, or else raising state borrowing limits
during busts and lowering them again during periods of growth. Unfortunately,
although measures of this sort could be helpful on the margin, even the
proponents of these measures do not claim they can fully solve state fiscal
volatility problems. 90

83.

See supra Part I.B.1.

84.

NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, RAINY DAY FUNDS: app. A., State Budget

Stabilization Funds (2004), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/rdfaxa.htm; Brian Knight & Arik
Levinson, Rainy Day Funds and State Government Savings, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 459 (1999).

85.

NASB, supra note 23, at 10-11.

86. ROBERT ZAHRADNIK, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, RAINY DAY FUNDS:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 1 (2005), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-16-07sfp.pdf [hereinafter
RAINY DAY FUNDS] (indicating that states had $30 billion in reserves to cover a need of

approximately $250 billion).
87. Super, supra note 48, at 2643.
88. See supra Part I.B.1.
89. See, e.g., RAINY DAY FUNDS, supra note 86; Gamage, supra note 82, at 664; Yilin Hou
& William Duncombe, State Saving Behavior. Effects of Two Fiscal and Budgetary Institutions,
28 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 48 (Fall 2008); Super, supra note 48. An extended discussion of these

measures and their limitations is beyond the scope of this paper. For an introduction to the topic,
see Dye & Merriman, supra note 33, at 245-46.

90.

See, e.g., NASB, supra note 23, at 11; Giertz & Giertz, supra note 30, at 130.
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Moreover, even if politicians could be forced to adequately finance rainy
day funds, they lack the information required to do so. State-level budget
forecasts have done a poor job of predicting future revenues: "[t]oo often
decisionmakers 'overreact' and assume that the future will be like the
immediate past."91 Budget analysts tend to be overly optimistic during booms
and overly pessimistic during busts.92 Analysts have poor information about

"when business-cycle turning points will occur ... [and] about how much the
economy will expand or contract. In practice, it is hard to distinguish cyclical
upswings from long-term growth."93 Although reformers should certainly press
states to make greater use of rainy-day funds, and there is room for more debate
on how to improve the operation of these funds, first-best measures of this sort
have little chance of ever resolving the fiscal volatility dilemma. 94
As alternative first-best solutions, states could look to the private sector or
to the federal government to provide revenue insurance, with the states paying
higher premiums during economic booms and receiving payouts during busts.
Looking first to the feasibility of private-sector insurance, similar problems
arise as with borrowing and rainy-day funds. State governments cannot
purchase insurance policies during downturns because doing so would be
equivalent to borrowing. As with direct borrowing, purchasing insurance that
paid out immediately, but with premiums not due until some later period of
economic recovery, would both tie the hands of future governments and create
potential for abuse. During economic booms, state governments could certainly
purchase insurance policies, just as they could contribute to rainy-day funds.
Yet governments lack the incentive to make these purchases during strong
economic periods. Unless our forecasting technologies improve dramatically, it
is unrealistic to expect state governments operating during strong economic
91.

NASB, supra note 23, at 11.

92. Id.
93. Dye & Merriman, supra note 33, at 246.
94. Id. at 245. Dye & Merriman highlight some of the difficulties inherent in relying on
saving during boom years to resolve fiscal volatility problems:
U.S. business cycles have not been symmetric-expansions have lasted about five
times as long as recessions. Observed revenue cycles are also asymmetric, with revenue
above trend for about four out of every six years. ... A government that wants to keep
spending equal to the average or trend level of revenue will be obligated to accumulate
surpluses long after actual revenues have begun to fall. Because the expansion lasts so
much longer than the contraction, the accumulated surplus must reach a very high peak
(more than $1,000 per capita or 50 percent of average annual revenues in our example).
And, also because of the asymmetry, the surplus would disappear in extremely short
order once revenues dip below trend. We doubt that many political actors could resist
the pressure to increase spending or cut taxes with surpluses of this magnitude and
could defend reserving so much revenue as insurance against future declines.
Even if sufficiently large rainy-day fund contributions could be mandated in light of forecasting
problems, politicians could easily raid these funds, either directly or indirectly through the use of
budgetary gimmicks. The impulses that lead the ordinary political process to channel all available
revenues into tax cuts and spending hikes can only be overcome through powerful countervailing
pressures-such as from capital markets or from antideficit norms. Historically, these pressures
have not operated to force saving during upturns.
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conditions to prepare adequately for later downturns.
Looking finally to federal government policies, the federal government
could mitigate state-level fiscal volatility problems by providing increased
countercyclical budget support. 95 Since the federal government can freely
accrue deficits during downturns while state governments cannot, it arguably
makes sense for the federal government to provide additional block grants to
states during busts, or to increase financing for countercyclical spending
programs like Medicaid. But with the notable exception of the Obama
administration's recent stimulus package, the trend in federal government
policy has been to provide less countercyclical budget support over time. 96
Moreover, as the next Section will argue, the federal government might
eventually adopt some sort of balanced budget constraint itself, thereby
reducing its potential to provide countercyclical support.
D. The Fiscal Volatility Problem at the Local, Comparative,and Federal
Levels

While this Article focuses on the fiscal volatility problem as it affects the
U.S. states, most of the Article's prescriptions also apply to the local,
comparative, and (potentially) to U.S. federal government levels.
Many local governments have been troubled by severe fiscal volatility. 9 7
Indeed, some of the larger cities have experienced worse fiscal volatility
problems than those faced by many states.9 Essentially all of this Article's
analysis holds for local-government fiscal volatility as well as for state-level
volatility.
Similarly, at the comparative level, many developing nations face
balanced-budget constraints that are as binding as those confronting the U.S.
states.99 As with U.S. state governments, the main explanations for these
phenomena are limitations on the supply of credit- and voter-enforced norms

95.

Super, supra note 48, at 2649.

96.

See id. at 2575.

97.

See, e.g., Edgerton et al., supra note 12, at 147 (noting that "significant distress"

pervades the local government sector); Steven G. Craig, How a City Can Survive a Boom and Bust
Cycle Without Bankruptcy: The Case of Houston, in 1997 PROC. 89TH ANN. CONF. NAT'L TAX

Ass'N 90, 90 (noting the near-constant use of the term "urban fiscal crisis" in connection with
cities over the past thirty years).
98. See Edgerton et al., supra note 12, at 147 (explaining that New York City's budget
problems in 2003 were at "the extreme of the distribution" of state and local budget crises).
99. See Alesina, Tabellini & Campante, supra note 60; Luis CatAo & Bennett Sutton,
Sovereign Defaults: The Role of Volatility (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/149,
2002); Michael Gavin & Roberto Perotti, Fiscal Policy in Latin America, in NBER
MACROECONOMICs ANNUAL 1997 11 (Ben S. Bernanke & Julio Rotemberg eds., 1997); Graciela
L. Kaminski, Carmen M. Reinhart & Carlos A. V6gh, When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical
Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies, in NBER MACROECONOMICs ANNUAL

2004 11

(Mark Gertler & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 2005); Ernesto Talvi & Carlos Vdgh, Tax Base Variability
and ProcyclicalFiscal Policy in Developing Countries, 78 J. DEV. EcON. 156 (2005).
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against accruing deficits. 00 The International Monetary Fund has also forced
the adoption of balanced budgets in some developing countries.' 0'
Developed nations generally do not experience significant problems with
fiscal volatility, as they can respond to downturns with deficit spending.' 0 2
Countries that have accumulated large amounts of public debt are exceptions to
this rule.' 0 3 Developed nations have more slack in their budgets for fiscal
management, but this slack can be exhausted through overuse of deficits. Once
a government accrues too much debt, voter distrust and capital market
discipline may require the government to apply a stricter policy of tying
expenditures to revenues. In turn, this creates even more serious fiscal volatility
dilemmas. Accordingly, both developing nations and developed countries that
have accumulated significant debt may benefit from this Article's suggestions
for coping with fiscal volatility.' 0 4
At the federal level in the United States, balanced budgets were the norm
throughout most of the country's history.' 0 5 The federal government employed
debt financing during some wars and recessions. Yet these debts were gradually
paid down during periods of peaceful economic growth. 10 6 Although not bound
by any formal balanced-budget requirement, historically most "politicians
'would have considered it to be immoral (to be a sin) to spend more than they
were willing to generate in tax revenue."' 0 7 According to Brennan and
Buchanan:
It may be argued that budget balance was a part of the existing fiscal
constitution of the United States prior to the Keynesian revolution in
the theory of economic policy. Even if the constitution did not contain
a formal, written requirement for budget balance, governmental

decision makers acted as if such a constraint did limit their fiscal

100. See Alesina, Tabellini & Campante, supra note 60, at 2-4; Roberto Perotti, Fiscal
Policy in Developing Countries: A Framework and Some Questions (World Bank Pol'y Res.

Working Paper No. 4365, 2007). Latin American nations have experienced particularly severe
problems with fiscal volatility.
101. Joseph Stiglitz, What I Learned at the World Economic Crisis, in GLOBALIZATION
AND THE POOR: EXPLOITATION OR EQUALIZER? 195, 196 (William Driscoll & Julie Clark eds.,

2003).
102.

Roberto Perotti, Estimating the Effects of Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries 2

(Innocenzo Gasparini Inst. for Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 276, 2004).
103. Alesina, Tabellini & Campante, supra note 60, at 1007 n.2.
104. There are additional complications influencing how national governments should
respond to fiscal volatility that are not considered in this Article, due to its focus on the U.S. state
level. The Article's prescriptions should be viewed as a relevant contribution to the literature on
comparative- and national-level fiscal volatility, but not as an authoritative guide for coping with
fiscal volatility on these levels.
105. Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV.
1105, 1152-75 (1998).

106.
107.

Alesina, supra note 58, at 5-6.
Staudt, supra note 105, at 1171 (quoting James M. Buchanan, Clarifying Confusion

About the Balanced Budget Amendment, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 347, 347-48 (1995)).
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behavior. 08
This model of budgetary balance lost most of its foundations after the
Great Depression, and appears to have fallen apart in recent years.1 09 The 1980s
witnessed a "radical departure" from historical practices "as budget deficits
accumulated in a period of peace and sustained growth."110 Congress
subsequently experimented with limited forms of formal balanced-budget
requirements, such as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act.11'
The Senate even came close to passing a balanced budget amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, with the measure failing by only one vote.l12 Whether as a
result of these measures, or due to the temporarily revitalized antideficit norms
behind them, the budget briefly returned to surplus as the economy boomed
during the late 1990s. 113
Unfortunately, these surpluses quickly evaporated, due to a combination
of tax cuts and an economic downturn.1 14 Although the economy later returned
to growth, the fiscal outlook continued to deteriorate even during the boom
years, as Congress passed new spending-such as a massive prescription drug
benefit-and additional tax cuts.115 Instead of generating surpluses to pay off
accumulated debts, the government continued to run large deficits. With the
onset of the recent financial crisis, deficit levels have skyrocketed. 116 The longterm outlook is even bleaker, as growth in Medicare and Social Security

GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
108.
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 755 (1999).

109. See, e.g., Yilin Hou, The Rise and Fall of the Norm of Budget Balance: Seeking a
Budgetary Logic Behind the FederalBudget Deficits (2007) (presented at Ann. Conf. of Ass'n for

Budgeting and Fin. Mgmt., October 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1027640; Alesina, supra note 58, at 5-11; Shaviro, supra note 55, at 28-27.
110.

Alesina, supra note 58, at 6.

111.

See, e.g., Rudolph G. Penner & C. Eugene Steuerle, Budget Rules, 57 NAT'L TAX. J.

547, 548-66 (2004); Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-RudmanHollings, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 593 (1988). The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act can

be considered a partial balanced budget constraint in that it attempted to make it more difficult for
Congress to increase deficits, even as a means of coping with downturns. See Shaviro, supra note
55, at 247.
112. Theodore Seto, Draftinga FederalBalancedBudget Amendment that Does What It Is
Supposed to Do (And No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1451 (1997). Critics cited the amendment's

lack of enforcement mechanisms as evidence that it would not have actually prevented deficit
spending. Supporters responded that the amendment's symbolic value would have been enough to
reestablish the antideficit norm that governed U.S. political culture for most of its history.
Compare Staudt, supra note 105, with Buchanan, supra note 107.
113. Alesina, Budget Surplus, supranote 58, at 3.
ALAN J. AUERBACH, WILLIAM G. GALE & PETER ORSZAG, URBAN INST., NEW
114.
ESTIMATES OF THE BUDGET OUTLOOK: PLUS qA CHANGE, PLUS C'EST LA MEME CHOSE (2006),

http://www.urban.org/publications/1000873.html.
115. Id.
See ALAN J. AUERBACH & WILLIAM
116.

G. GALE, BROOKINGS INST., THE ECONOMIC

CRISIS AND THE FISCAL CRISIS: 2009 AND BEYOND (2009), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/

2009/0219_fiscal future gale.aspx.
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entitlements are expected to create a fiscal gap of unprecedented magnitude.
In short, the federal government appears to be experiencing a similar
dynamic to the one that caused the states to default on their debts and adopt
balanced-budget requirements in the nineteenth century."' 8 The national
government has more slack in its budget than the states or than any foreign
nation, but this slack is not infinite. As Daniel Shaviro writes:
To call our fiscal policy over the last fifty years a giant Ponzi scheme
is not hyperbole but precise analytic description. Each generation has
come out ahead by passing on a larger deferred tax bill to the next.
However, the growth of unfunded obligations-less from explicit debt
than from Social Security and Medicare-relative to GDP indicates
that the Ponzi scheme probably cannot be sustained in its current form
for much longer." 9
If this fiscal "Ponzi scheme" collapses, the federal government will need
to transition back to a norm of greater budgetary balance.120 Congress might
have the political courage to enact this transition directly, overcoming the
collective action problems that led to the current dilemma. But it seems more
likely that Congress will first pass some form of balanced-budget constraint, as
it considered doing in the late 1980s and 1990s, in the hopes of fostering a
norm of budget balancing.' 21 Alternatively, credit markets or voters might
apply external pressure to force the government to better tie expenditures to
revenues.122 In either case, the federal government may well face fiscal
volatility problems of its own at some point in the future.123
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
119. Shaviro, supra note 55, at 308.
120. Arguably, the currently dominant deficit measurements are inadequate for this
purpose and will need to be replaced by alternatives that better account for future liabilities. See
id.

121. By using a balanced-budget constraint as a precommitment device, Congress could
potentially overcome the collective action problems that hinder efforts to address directly the
sources of fiscal unsustainability. This was the idea motivating the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.
See Stith, supra note Il l, at 621-69. Balanced budget constraints might also serve to reassure
government bond holders or taxpayers (or anyone concerned about inflation), once painful
adjustments are made, that the dynamics leading to unsustainability will not be repeated. This was
the main reason states adopted balanced-budget constraints after the debt crises of the 1900s. See
supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
122. This is essentially what has happened in many developing countries and in developed
nations that have accrued unsustainable levels of debt. See supra notes 102-104 and
accompanying text.
123. Notably, the magnitude of fiscal volatility has increased dramatically at the federal
level in recent years, and this volatility may be interfering with the reestablishment of antideficit
norms. See Edmund L. Andrews, Those Wild Budget Swings, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 2006 at 4.

During upturns, politicians can claim credit for deficit reductions that are merely cyclical. This has
caused some commentators-and possibly a significant number of voters-to conclude that
deficits do not matter or that taxes can be cut without revenue loss. See DANIEL SHAVIRo, TAXES,
SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GoVERNMENT'S MARCH TOWARDS BANKRUPTCY 53 (2007) (quoting

former Vice President Cheney as claiming "[d]eficts don't matter" and proceeding to discuss the
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II
ORDINARY POLITICS

Fiscal volatility is a significant and growing problem. The political debate
tends to focus on the steady-state settings for tax and spending policies. But
however these programs are set in their steady states, at least some components
of state fiscal policy must also fluctuate as the economy cycles. Volatility must
be allocated to some combination of tax and spending policies.
This Part addresses the ordinary politics question: what is the optimal
allocation of fiscal volatility across state tax and spending programs? Ignoring
political considerations, which programs should states fluctuate as their
economies cycle?
Since political considerations are what prevent states from implementing
first-best solutions to fiscal volatility, it may seem strange to discuss secondbest coping strategies while ignoring their political feasibility. Part III of this
Article will thus analyze procedural mechanisms for coping with fiscal
volatility within the realm of institutional-design policy. Yet before we can
determine how budgetary processes should be shaped to influence ordinary
political behavior, we need to know which political behaviors we ought to
influence.
States have numerous policies they can adjust to cope with fiscal
volatility. For example, states can increase and decrease spending programs,
either through across-the-board hikes and cuts, or by targeting specific
programs. Alternatively, states can raise and lower the rates of broad-based
taxes (such as income, sales, and property taxes) or narrower taxes (such as
luxury taxes and capital gains taxes). Or states can broaden and narrow their tax
bases, altering the scope of what is subject to taxation. States can also raise and
lower license and user fees, or expand and contract the use of other means for
generating revenues. States can respond to fiscal volatility by fluctuating any of
these policies, or any combination of the policies. Yet however it is allocated,
fiscal volatility creates economic harm due to risk aversion and from planning
costs.
That individuals are generally risk averse is a central feature of the
economy and underlies much of financial economics.1 24 Investors charge a
substantial risk premium before investing in volatile assets, and certain returns
are greatly preferred to variable returns. Fiscal volatility increases the risk and
uncertainty inherent in the economy. As Louis Kaplow explains, instability of
government policies-such as fluctuating tax or spending programs-is as
much a source of risk and uncertainty as are changes in the economic climate;
"[w]hether imposed by the government, by nature, or a casino, there is risk all

politics of budget deficits).
124.

KENNETH ARROw, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 90 (1971).
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the same."l 25
Moreover, fluctuations in government policies create planning costs for
anyone that the policies affect. Members of the business community have long
complained that "they cannot make plans if they don't have confidence in the
tax structure."l 2 6 Similarly, the directors of government programs find it
difficult to plan when they do not know the future size of their budgets, as do
the programs' beneficiaries.
Due to factors like risk aversion and planning costs, fiscal volatility is
harmful regardless of how it is managed. Yet some strategies for coping with
fiscal volatility are more harmful than others. In recent years, the majority of
fiscal volatility has been allocated to spending programs, with broad-based tax
hikes becoming increasingly rare. 127 The remainder of this Part argues that this
allocation is far from optimal. Contrary to current policy, states should deal
with the majority of fiscal volatility by raising and lowering the rates of broadbased taxes.
The rationale for this conclusion comes from risk-allocation theory.
Lawyers and economists have spent decades developing principles for how best
to allocate forms of volatility, risk, and uncertainty. 128 These principles play an
essential role in our understandings of numerous policy areas, particularly tort
law and insurance regulation. 129 This Article is the first to apply these
principles to the fiscal volatility problem.130
The central normative finding of risk allocation theory is the principle of
risk spreading: all else being equal, dispersed risks are less harmful than
125.

Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX

J. 139, 145 (1989).
126.

David S. Bizer & Kenneth L. Judd, Taxation and Uncertainty, 79 AM. EcON. REV.

331, 335 (1989).
127.

See supra Part I.A.

128. These are related concepts. From the perspective of actors affected by tax or spending
programs, fiscal volatility can be thought of as a form of either risk or uncertainty.
Although the terms "risk" and "uncertainty" have distinct meanings, the differences between
them are unimportant for our purposes. I will thus use the terms "volatility," "risk," and
"uncertainty" interchangeably. For more on this topic, see, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921); Arrow, supra note 124; History of Economic Thought

Website, Choice Under Risk and Uncertainty, http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/essays/uncert/
choicecont.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). When distinctions are made between the terms "risk"
and "uncertainty," "risk" refers to when future outcomes are unknown, but when the probability
distribution of those outcomes is known. In contrast, "uncertainty" refers to when neither future
outcomes nor the probabilities of those outcomes occurring are known. KNIGHT at 233-34.
129.

See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts,

70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
130. There is an existing literature analyzing the effects of uncertainty on public investment
decisions. However this literature focuses on idiosyncratic risks affecting only a single
government program. The literature does not discuss how systematic risks-like fiscal volatilityshould be allocated between taxation and spending. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind,
Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. EcoN. REv. 364 (1970);
S.M. Kanbur, Risk Taking and Taxation: An Alternative Perspective, 15 J. PUB. EcON. 163

(1981).
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concentrated risks. Risk spreading can be accomplished directly by allocating
risk and uncertainty across as many individuals as possible, or across as many
sectors of the economy as possible. Risk spreading can also be accomplished
indirectly, by allocating risk and uncertainty to actors who are better able to
either purchase insurance against volatility or to self-insure through borrowing
and saving. To see why coping with the majority of fiscal volatility by
adjusting the rates of broad-based taxes furthers the goal of risk spreading, it is
useful to make two comparisons.
The first comparison considers the risk-bearing characteristics of
taxpayers as a class, as opposed to the risk-bearing characteristics of the
beneficiaries of public spending as a class. In this first comparison, it is

important to realize that state fiscal policies are redistributive.131 At least on the
margin, increasing state taxation by a dollar in order to fund an additional
dollar of spending tends to benefit the poor more than the wealthy.
Redistributing volatility from the poor to the wealthy accomplishes risk
spreading directly, due to the simple fact that the wealthy have more money.
Further, redistributing volatility from the poor to the wealthy accomplishes
risk-spreading indirectly, because the wealthy are better able to borrow during
downturns, save during upturns, and purchase insurance from third parties.
The second comparison considers the risk-bearing characteristics of
aggregate government-spending activities as opposed to those of aggregate
private-sector-economicactivities. First, it is important to understand that, in

the absence of tax rate adjustments, revenue volatility is several times larger
than economic volatility.132 Hence, tax rate adjustments are necessary to spread
fiscal volatility more evenly across the entire state economy, rather than
concentrating the harmful effects of fiscal volatility in public-sector spending
programs. Second, with regard to indirect risk spreading, political constraints
limit the extent to which government spending programs can save, borrow, or
insure, and the extent to which spending volatility can be efficiently allocated
across subprograms. Private-sector economic actors are less constrained on
these dimensions. 33
The principle of risk spreading thus provides a prima facie argument for
why states should adjust the rates of broad-based taxes as the preferred method
for coping with fiscal volatility, rather than fluctuating state government
spending. However, it is important to note that not all tax rate adjustments
spread risk efficiently. For example, fluctuating the rates of a narrow tax, borne
by only a small portion of a state's population, would not accomplish risk
spreading. Moreover, when it comes to implementation, not all state taxes can
be adjusted without creating excess economic harm. For instance, fluctuating
taxes on capital gains is likely a poor method for coping with fiscal volatility;
131.
132.
133.

See infra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 175-182 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 183-190 and accompanying text.
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because taxpayers control the timing of when their gains are realized, they are
likely to delay their gain realizations until periods with lower tax rates. In
contrast, timing effects of this sort are a minor problem with respect to
adjusting the rates of state property taxes. A full discussion of implementation
concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, largely because implementation
concerns are likely to differ significantly amongst the various states. Still, it is
important to remember that the risk-spreading principle only supports adjusting
the rates of broad-basedstate taxes, not of all state tax instruments.
The remainder of this Part further elaborates the risk-spreading argument
for coping with the majority of fiscal volatility by adjusting the rates of broadbased taxes. Part II.A sets the stage for conducting an applied risk analysis by
discussing several background issues and then explaining how risk spreading
minimizes the harm from both risk aversion and planning costs. Part II.B then
demonstrates why more risk spreading is accomplished by adjusting the rates of
broad-based taxes than by fluctuating state government spending.
A. Setting the Stagefor an Applied Risk Analysis

This Part argues that the question of how to best allocate fiscal
volatility-whether by fluctuating spending in the public sector, or by
fluctuating tax rates in the private sector-is a question of applied risk analysis.
However, a few background issues must be resolved before turning to risk
analysis theory.
To begin, one of this Article's central premises is that the question of how
to allocate fiscal volatility optimally can be separated from the question of the
optimal size of state government. Yet this premise requires further support.
After all, as a conservative critic might question, "If state government spending
is largely wasteful, and if taxes are extremely harmful, shouldn't we allocate
volatility primarily to wasteful state spending while shielding the private sector
from the harmful effects of tax rate fluctuations?"
Of course, the conservative critic is correct insofar as one accepts the
assumptions underlying her argument. If states tax and spend more than is
optimal, then the harm from tax rate fluctuations will be magnified, and the
harm from spending fluctuations reduced. Conversely, if states raise too few
dollars through taxes, and fund public services below the optimal level, then
allocating fiscal volatility to spending will be more harmful than allocating
volatility to tax rates-even ignoring the implications of applied risk analysis.
Determining the optimal size of a state government requires making
tradeoffs between the excess burden caused by taxation, on the one hand, and
the public good effects and the desirable redistribution caused by public
spending on the other hand. 134 This Article does not claim that the current size
134. See, e.g., Vidar Christiansen, Two Approaches to Determine Public Good Provision
under Distortionary Taxation, 60 NAT'L TAX. J. 25 (2007); Louis Kaplow, Public Goods and The
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of state governments is optimal. However, if a state's government is either too
large or too small, the appropriate response is to address this imbalance
directly. Once steady-state optimality has been restored, the question of how to
allocate volatility around the new steady state remains an issue.
This Article's inquiry into how states should cope with fiscal volatility is
essentially a second-order question. In other words, if one strongly believes that
states currently spend either dramatically too much, or far too little, then those
beliefs will affect one's conclusions about how states should cope with fiscal
volatility. Yet whatever a state's non-cyclical level of taxes and spending, this
level has been effectively chosen by the state's dominant political coalition. A
dominant political coalition may choose to change the steady-state level of
taxes and spending. But whatever choices a political coalition makes about
steady-state policy, it must also decide how to allocate volatility around that
steady state. This latter question is primarily a matter of applied risk analysis.13 5
As such, the analysis in this Part proceeds as though steady-state levels for
taxes and spending are approximately optimal. Additionally, this Part assumes
that state spending as a whole is neither a luxury good nor an essential, as
compared to aggregate private-sector spending.136 To illustrate, entertainment
purchases are thought to be luxury goods as compared to food purchases. As
personal income rises, a typical individual will spend more on entertainment
than on food. If the same relationship held for public goods as compared to
private consumption, we might want state governments to increase spending
during upturns and cut spending during downturns.
Yet there is no particular reason to think that government expenditures as
a whole are luxury goods as compared to aggregate private expenditures. The
majority of state general-account spending funds four types of expenditures:
elementary and secondary education (36%), Medicaid and other public
assistance (19%), higher education (12%), and corrections (7%).137 Although
these expenditures are probably luxury goods when compared to food
purchases, they are probably not luxury goods when compared to many
entertainment purchases.

Distribution of Income, 50 EUR. EcON. REV. 1627 (2006); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki,
Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions: The Marginal Cost of Funds and the Marginal
Benefit ofProjects, 54 NAT'L TAX. J. 189 (2001).

135. Without quantifying the amount of harm that could be mitigated by improving the risk
allocation of fiscal volatility, it is hard to know how serious the risk-spreading problem is as
compared to the size-of-government problem (if there even is a size-of-government problem). Yet
there already exists an enormous literature examining the size-of-government problem, whereas
this is the first paper to evaluate the risk-spreading implications of state-level fiscal volatility. In
order to analyze effectively the risk-spreading decision, it is useful to cabin the size-ofgovernment decision.
136.

For a discussion of the concept of luxury goods, see PAUL KRUGMAN, ROBIN WELLS

& MARTHA L. OLNEY, ESSENTIALS OF EcONOMICS 122 (2007).

137.

2003 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT, supra note 44, at 13.
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When tax adjustments cause individuals to reduce their private
consumption, individuals can still choose which elements of private
consumption on which they will spend less. Hence, when taxes are raised
during downturns, individuals should respond by reducing spending primarily
on luxury goods. When public spending is cut during downturns, program
administrators can likewise respond by reducing spending primarily on the
most luxury elements of their spending programs. But, in contrast to private
consumers' decision making, the government's process for determining which
public expenditures to cut tends to be more haphazard and political. Moreover,
public sector managers have incentives to maximize the appearance of
hardship, so as to fight off calls for further cuts to their budgets; thus, they do
not necessarily allocate spending cuts to the most luxury aspects of their
programs. Overall, it seems reasonable to assume that public sector spending
is neither a luxury good nor an essential, as compared to private-sector
spending, at least as a first-order (or perhaps zeroth-order) approximation.' 3 9
As a final background issue, it is worth briefly discussing the relevance of
fiscal stimulus. According to traditional Keynesian models, governments
should borrow during economic downturns in order to both reduce taxes and
increase spending, while doing the opposite during upturns.140 However,
balanced-budget constraints prevent state governments from borrowing during
downturns, thus requiring tax hikes and spending cuts-the opposite of the
traditional Keynesian prescriptions.141 Hence, for the purposes of this Article,
the stimulus question depends on whether tax hikes or spending cuts are more
harmful when a state's economy operates below trend.
Although the literature on this question is sparse, a few economists have
argued that raising taxes to increase spending during downturns may have
desirable stimulatory effects.142 Nevertheless, the stimulus differences between
tax and spending fluctuations at the state level are probably small.14 3 Plus, there
is considerable uncertainty in the macroeconomic literature about the efficacy
of Keynesian stimulus even at thefederal level, where deficit-financed stimulus
is possible and much larger sums of money are at stake.' As applied to the
138. See Super, supra note 48, at 2611-40. See also infra notes 185-187 and
accompanying text.
139. A "zeroth-order approximation" is roughly equivalent to an educated first guess.
140. See DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF & JASON FURMAN, BROOKINGS INST., IF, WHEN, How:
A PRIMER ON FISCAL STIMULUS 7-9 (2008); Shaviro, supra note 55, at 205-11.

141.

See Super, supra note 48, at 2607-11.

142.

See, e.g., Edgerton et al., supra note 12; ALISSA ANDERSON, CALIF. BUDGET PROJECT,

BUDGET CUTS OR TAX INCREASES: WHICH ARE PREFERABLE DURING AN ECONOMIC DOWNTURN?

(2008), http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2008/0807_pp cutsortaxes.pdf.
143. Glenn Follette, Andrea Kusko & Byron Lutz, State and Local Finances and the
Macroeconomy: The High-Employment Budget and Fiscal Impetus, 61 NAT'L TAX. J. 531, 544

(2008) (concluding that the macroeconomic effects of state government policy options are
"relatively modest").
144. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Rethinking the Role of Fiscal Policy, 99 AM. EcON. REV.
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fiscal volatility question, the stimulatory differences between tax and spending
fluctuations should probably be considered a minor factor in the overall
analysis. 145
Moving beyond the background issues, the remainder of this Part analyzes
the question of how states should allocate fiscal volatility as a question of
applied risk analysis. Risk analysis theory traditionally asks which actors and
institutions are best able to manage risk or uncertainty to minimize their
harmful effects. As applied to fiscal volatility, risk analysis likewise inquires
into whether state spending programs or private sector taxpayers are better able
to cope with the risk and uncertainty that would be created by fluctuating either
spending or tax rates. Part II.A will discuss how the two main risk-related
harms caused by fiscal volatility can be minimized through risk spreading. Part
II.B will argue that allocating the majority of fiscal volatility to tax rate
adjustments rather than to spending fluctuations accomplishes maximal risk
spreading.
1. The Harmfrom Risk Aversion

The first major harm caused by fiscal volatility flows from risk aversion
on the part of individuals and economic actors. "It is widely accepted that
individuals are not indifferent to uncertainty and will not, in general, value
assets with uncertain returns at their expected values."l 46 Investors typically
consider "yield to be a good thing; risk, a bad thing; gambling, to be
avoided."1 4 7 Financial markets function by trading off between the expected
returns of financial products and the volatility surrounding those returns.148
When the expected returns of an investment are volatile, lenders discount the
returns, which forces borrowers to pay a risk premium in order to attract
investment funds. Likewise, taxpayers prefer certainty about their future levels
of taxation, and the beneficiaries of public spending prefer certainty about their
future benefit levels. Regardless of whether it is allocated to taxes or to
spending, fiscal volatility creates harm due to risk aversion.14 9

556 (2009); John B. Taylor, The Lack of an Empirical Rationalefor a Revival of Discretionary
FiscalPolicy, 99 AM. EcON. REV. 550 (2009).
145. In any case, exploring these issues more fully is beyond the scope of this Article.
146. Arrow & Lind, supra note 130, at 364.
147. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 91 (1952).
148.

See STEPHEN A. Ross, NEOCLASSICAL FINANCE 1 (2005).

149. See, e.g., Kelly D. Edmiston, Tax Uncertainty and Investment: A Cross-Country
EmpiricalInvestigation, 42 EcoN. INQUIRY 425 (2004). However, some research has found that
volatility in capital income taxation can be welfare enhancing. See, e.g., Bizer & Judd, supra note
126; Michael Dotsey, The Economic Effects ofProduction Taxes in a Stochastic Growth Model,
80 AM. EcON. REV. 1168 (1990). See also James Alm, Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual
Behavior, and Welfare, 78 AM. EcON. REV. 237 (1988) (concluding that uncertainty in the tax
base may positively affect welfare, while uncertainty in tax rates generally negatively affects
welfare, as tax base uncertainty-but not tax rate uncertainty-deters undesirable tax planning).
But see Julie H. Collins & Daniel P. Murphy, Experimental Evidence of the Effect of Tax Rate
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The standard explanation for risk aversion comes from the diminishing
marginal utility of money.150 Individuals generally value each additional dollar
less than the previous dollar, such that having $2,000 generates less than twice
as much utility as having only $1,000. Consequently, individuals should and do
prefer a 100% chance of winning $1,000 to a 50% chance of winning $2,000.
Although the two bets have the same expected dollar value, the second bet
produces a lower expected utility.s15
Diminishing marginal utility is not unique to money. Individuals receive
diminishing marginal utility from nearly all forms of consumption.152 Even
someone who prefers apples to oranges might select an orange in place of the
hundredth apple. And while food and clothing might be more essential than
entertainment items, the fuller one's fridge and closet the more valuable the
entertainment items become as compared to additional food and clothing.
In fact, the reason money produces diminishing marginal utility is that all
of the goods that can be purchased with money generate diminishing marginal
At any income level, individuals should purchase the mix of
utility.'
consumption items that maximizes their potential utility from monetary
purchases. But as the adage goes, "you cannot buy happiness." Much of what
individuals desire cannot be purchased on the market. The more monetary
goods one owns, the less valuable additional monetary goods become as
compared to nonmarket goods like love, health, and the benefits of public
spending. 154 Just as the diminishing marginal utility from monetary goods
creates risk aversion with respect to volatile tax payments, the diminishing

Uncertainty on Security Prices, Investor Clienteles, and Tax Payments, 17 J. AM. TAX Ass'N 1, 24

(1995) ("These findings imply that prior literature . . . (e.g., Alm 1988) may overestimate the
welfare loss to investors and the tax revenue loss to the government as a result of tax rate
uncertainty. Our results indicate investors demand 'compensation' for tax rate uncertainty and this
'risk premia' leads to higher investor expected tax payments.").
150. Kaplow, supra note 125, at 152 n.21; Matthew Rabin & Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: Risk Aversion, 15 J. EcON. PERSP. 219, 219 (2001).

151. Rabin and Thaler, supra note 150, at 219-30, argue that the standard view (that risk
aversion arises from the diminishing marginal utility of money) cannot explain the fact that
individuals are averse to small risks as well as to large risks. Instead, Rabin and Thaler suggest
that risk aversion results from the biases of loss aversion and mental accounting. There are also
other nonstandard theories for why individuals are averse to risk and uncertainty. See, e.g., Yoram
Halevy & Vincent Feltkamp, A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion, 72 REv. EcON.

STUD. 449 (2005). Yet, like the standard model, the nonstandard explanations for risk aversion
also conclude that individuals exhibit increasing marginal risk aversion. Hence, the nonstandard
views are equally consistent with the arguments of this Article as is the standard model. (Although
I rely on the standard view of risk aversion in the text of this Article because it is far more widely
accepted than the alternatives, I'll note as a tangent that I am partially persuaded by Rabin and
Thaler's critique).
152.

See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONoMIcs 68-91(2001).

153. Id.
154. Even billionaires may be frustrated by crime (lack of police funding), traffic (lack of
transportation spending), and the like. Purchasing a private jet or one's own security force does
not provide a perfect substitute.
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marginal utility from publicly provided goods creates risk aversion with respect
to volatile government spending. No matter how much one values goods like
public transportation or education, at some point adding more roads and
schools becomes less valuable than the private consumption that must be
forgone in order to pay for the nth highway or school building.
Due to the diminishing marginal utility of money, concentrated risks are
more harmful than dispersed risks. Risk spreading reduces the harm from risk
and uncertainty because each marginal unit of risk affecting an individual or
economic actor is more harmful than the previous units. As such, if two
individuals are identical, except that one bears a high level of risk and the other
a low level, then transferring a unit of risk from the high risk-bearing individual
to the low risk-bearing individual will reduce the total harm caused by the
risk.155 The very feature that causes risk aversion-the diminishing marginal
utility of money-directly justifies the principle of risk spreading.
2. The Harmfrom PlanningCosts

In addition to the harm created by risk aversion, fiscal volatility also
creates harm due to planning costs. Risk aversion primarily affects
consumption (the degree to which individuals derive value from economic
goods). Risk aversion can also significantly impact production, by discouraging
risky behavior that would have been expected to create value for society,1 but
these effects are secondary. In contrast, planning costs primarily concern
production.
Individuals and firms often need to make investment decisions in the
present in order to maximize production in the future. These decisions
sometimes entail sunk costs. For instance, students typically enroll in law
school so as to earn a salary from practicing law. If the legal market later
changes so that a student can no longer find employment, the time and money
spent on law school are not refundable. Similarly, firms make capital
investments in order to generate future revenues. If demand for a firm's product
subsequently evaporates, the firm may not be able to recoup the invested
155. This transfer would be efficient and welfare-enhancing following the Kaldor-Hicks
methodology.
156. As Kenneth Arrow explains, supra note 124, at 137-38, "at any moment society is
faced with a set of possible new projects which are on the average profitable though one cannot
know for sure which particular projects will succeed and which will fail. If risks cannot be shifted,
then very possibly none of the projects will be undertaken." Volatility can deter entrepreneurs and
investors from taking on risks that would be expected to improve societal welfare. Moreover,
firms as well as individuals can be risk-averse. Arrow and Lind, supra note 130, at 376. Both the
managers of firms and stockholders owning large blocks of shares can cause firms to act in a riskaverse fashion. Consequently, by adding risk to the economy, fiscal volatility can deter both firms
and individuals from socially-desirable entrepreneurial activities. Although the additional risk
caused by fiscal volatility is not directly connected to entrepreneurial activities, it may combine
with the risk already inherent in these activities to deter risk-taking behavior that would not have
been deterred based on the inherent risk alone.
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resources.
Public administrators must likewise make planning decisions in the
presence of sunk costs. For example, schools are built based on projected future
education spending. Uncertainty about how much funding will be available for
hiring teachers can lead administrators to build schools that are either too small
or too large. While education suffers when too many students are crammed into
an overcrowded space, there is little point in having built more classrooms if
funds do not permit hiring enough teachers to utilize them.
Allocating fiscal volatility to spending can force administrators to fire
staff after putting them through costly training programs, to abandon
construction projects that have already been partially built, or to otherwise
misallocate resources over time and across types of expenses. 157 In addition to
these primary costs, volatility in public spending creates secondary costs that
affect the beneficiaries of government programs and any private-sector
individuals or contractors who are paid to work on the programs. If uncertain
funding creates the possibility that administrators will have to fire staff or to
stop paying for contractors, the administrators will have to pay more to hire the
staff and contractors in order to offset staff and contractors' risk premiums.1
Moreover, if the staff or contractors incur sunk costs in order to make
themselves eligible for government work, volatile spending will impose further
costs on the staff and contractors which will force the administrators to pay
even more in order to hire their services.1 59
Looking to program beneficiaries, spending volatility can again impose
costs even above the harm that risk aversion causes. Individuals and firms often
make decisions in reliance on government programs. These decisions may
involve sunk costs. For instance, firms decide where to build plants based
partially on the state of local roads and other infrastructure. If the state later
cuts spending so that the infrastructure quality is no longer sufficient for the
firm's purposes, the firm may need to abandon the plant or pay for expensive
alternatives to the infrastructure. Individuals face similar dilemmas to the
extent they buy housing based on the quality of neighborhood schools. And if
firms structure their severance policies-or if individuals make saving
decisions-based even partially on state-funded job retraining programs or
unemployment benefits, any changes to these benefits can leave individuals
worse off than they would have been if they had been able to make decisions in
157. Just as planning costs can force administrators to fire staff or abandon projects during
downturns, during upturns the administrators may find they have not previously hired enough staff
or started construction projects early enough, and that surplus funds can thus not be used
efficiently. See Matthews, supra note 49, at 306.
158. See supra note 156.
159. For instance, students must apply for teacher training programs at least a year or two
in advance of seeking teaching jobs. Since volatile spending makes the availability of teaching

jobs fluctuate significantly over time, this volatility probably deters some students from becoming
teachers who would otherwise be inclined to enter the profession.
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anticipation of the changes.
Fiscal volatility thus creates significant planning costs, whether allocated
to taxes or to public spending. Just as public administrators plan based on
expectations about their future budgets, taxpayers make planning decisions
based on expected future returns. Volatility in taxes creates uncertainty in those
returns. If a tax hike makes an economic activity unprofitable after taxes, the
activity may need to be abandoned even if nonrefundable resources have
already been expended on it.' 60 Additionally, as with spending, volatility in
taxes also imposes secondary costs on the beneficiaries of private-sector
projects and on anyone hired or contracted to work on those projects. For
example, if a tax scheme makes a store unprofitable, the store may close, and
anyone who worked at the store or who planned on purchasing needed items
from the store will suffer.
Risk spreading can reduce the harm from planning costs because planning
costs increase on the margin. All else being equal, a $2,000 loss of public
funding or tax increase should create more than twice as much harm from
planning costs as a $1,000 loss of funding or tax increase. Whether they operate
in the public or private sectors, individuals and organizations generally
maintain some level of reserves-or slack-that can be used to meet
unexpected challenges.16 For individuals, this slack can include previously
saved funds, temporarily increased work effort, favors called in from friends
and family, and anything else the individual can do to cope with a negative
shock without abandoning sunk resources. Similarly, organizations can ask
their employees to work harder for short periods, temporarily reduce employee
benefits or overhead, or engage in a variety of similar coping mechanisms.
Because individuals and organizations have only finite levels of slack, the
planning costs associated with fiscal volatility should generate increasing
marginal harm. While small amounts of volatility can often be dealt with
through reserves, increasing levels of volatility will eventually exhaust
available reserves, forcing the abandonment of sunk resources and thereby
creating far larger marginal costs. Furthermore, even after reserves have been
expended, we might reasonably expect organizations and individuals first to
abandon projects with few sunk costs and only later to abandon projects with
greater sunk costs. To the extent that economic actors can allocate the costs of
volatility across subprojects, volatility should thus generate increasing marginal
160. By "unprofitable" I mean unprofitable in the economic sense; a project becomes
unprofitable if the resources that must still be invested in order to complete the project could yield
greater returns if diverted to an alternative use (the opportunity costs of continuing the project
exceed the expected gains).
161. See, e.g., Joseph L.C. Cheng & Idalene F. Kesner, OrganizationalSlack and Response
to Environmental Shis: The Impact of Resource Allocation Patterns, 23 J. MGMT. I (1997)

(discussing how slack operates in an environmental policy context); Jitendra V. Singh,
Performance, Slack, and Risk Taking in OrganizationalDecision Making, 29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 562
(1986).
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planning costs.
Just as the diminishing marginal utility of money justifies the risk
spreading principle with respect to risk aversion, the presence of increasing
marginal planning costs justifies the risk-spreading principle with respect to
planning costs. In both cases, transferring a unit of risk from an actor facing
greater additional risks to an actor facing lesser additional risks will reduce the
harm caused by that unit of risk, because additional units of risk are more
harmful on the margin.
B. Conducting an Applied Risk Analysis for Fiscal Volatility

As the previous Section explained, risk spreading can mitigate the harms
caused by both risk aversion and planning costs-the two major harms from
fiscal volatility. Hence, as a general rule, the optimal method for coping with
fiscal volatility is likely the method that best accomplishes risk spreading. This
Section argues that maximal risk spreading is accomplished when fiscal
volatility is dealt with primarily by adjusting the rates of broad-based taxes.
This argument is demonstrated first by comparing the risk-bearing
characteristics of taxpayers to those of the beneficiaries of public spending, and
second by comparing the risk-bearing characteristics of public spending
activities to those of private-sector economic activities.
1. Comparing Taxpayers to the Beneficiaries ofPublic Spending

When fiscal volatility is resolved by fluctuating tax rates, the harmful
effects of the volatility fall on taxpayers. Conversely, when fiscal volatility is
resolved by fluctuating spending, the harmful effects of the volatility fall on the
beneficiaries of public spending programs. To a large degree, these categories
overlap, as every citizen of a state both pays taxes and benefits from public
spending.162 Yet these groups do not overlap perfectly. Some state citizens will
receive more net benefit (from spending minus taxes) than will others.
Taken as a whole, state fiscal policy is redistributive on the margin. Many
states' tax systems are considered regressive in that they take a higher
percentage of poor taxpayers' incomes than they do of rich taxpayers'
incomes.163 For instance, sales taxes are considered regressive because they
typically constitute a higher percentage of poor taxpayers' incomes than of rich
taxpayers' incomes. Nevertheless, in every state, marginal spending is
sufficiently progressive so as to more than make up for these regressive taxes.

162. While not every citizen receives direct payments from a state, every citizen benefits to
at least some extent from spending programs such as transportation infrastructure, education, and
the criminal justice system.
163. See Robert J. Landry, III, The Regressivity of Individual State Taxes from 1980 to
2000:

A
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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=927150##.
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As mentioned earlier, three-quarters of state general account spending
falls into four major categories: elementary and secondary education (36%),
Medicaid and other public assistance (19%), higher education (12%), and
corrections (7%).164 Of these, Medicaid and public assistance are clearly
progressive in that they primarily benefit poor taxpayers. Tax-funded education
spending is also highly progressive, even though the wealthy arguably benefit
more from education spending than the poor. This is because education dollars
are not distributed as unequally as is income.165 Even if a rich taxpayer with an
annual income of $200,000 derives twice as much value from education
spending as a poor taxpayer with an annual income of $20,000, as a percent of
income, the poor taxpayer still receives five times as much benefit as the rich
taxpayer.
The key to the above example is that progressivity in taxes is usually
measured as a percent of income, while the redistributive quality of spending is
usually measured in dollar amounts. Even "regressive" sales taxes take far
more in dollars from rich taxpayers than from poor taxpayers. Although
education spending might provide more absolute benefit to the rich than to the
poor, this disparity is unlikely to be so large as to surmount the greater dollar
amounts the rich are paying in taxes. For almost all forms of state spending,
raising taxes by a dollar in order to fund an additional dollar of spending should
redistribute resources from rich taxpayers to poor taxpayers.
Of the four major categories of state general account spending, only
corrections might be an exception to this rule. Spending on prisons and law
enforcement arguably benefits the rich far more than the poor, perhaps enough
to overwhelm the differences in tax dollars paid. Following similar logic, it is
often argued that the wealthy derive far more benefit from government
spending, as a whole, than do the poor, as there would be little or no wealth
without government (in the state of nature).1 66 While this argument might be
valid for state expenditures as a whole, its logic fails when considering state
expenditures on the margin. When examining the types of spending that are
actually cut during downturns and increased during upturns, it seems clear that
marginal spending hikes benefit the poor more than the wealthy. The vast
majority of spending fluctuations occur in the categories of Medicaid and other

164. 2003 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT, supra note 44, at 4. Again, this Article only
discusses state general-account spending as this is the spending subject to balanced-budget
constraints. Spending funded by the states' capital budgets is not usually cut during downturns.
165. There is no straightforward way to calculate the extent to which different income
groups benefit from education spending. But, at least to me, it seems implausible to think that the
benefits of education spending are distributed as unequally in dollar values as are incomes.
166. See, e.g., LiAM MURPHY & THOMAs NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE (2002); cf Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit,

Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REv. 399, 406 (2005) (acknowledging and
disputing this argument).
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public assistance, higher education, and elementary and secondary education.'
Raising taxes by a few percentage points in order to fund additional spending in
these areas almost certainly benefits the poor more than the wealthy.'68
Hence, allocating volatility to taxes has a greater impact on wealthy
taxpayers, and allocating volatility to spending has a greater impact on poorer
taxpayers. To make this observation into a normative argument, we need only
conclude that volatility causes less overall harm when allocated to wealthy
taxpayers than when allocated to poorer taxpayers.
The first argument supporting this conclusion examines the direct riskspreading effects of redistributing volatility. Remember that both risk aversion
and planning costs create increasing marginal harm. Each additional unit of
volatility creates more harm from both risk aversion and planning costs than
did the previous units. For risk aversion, harm increases on the margin due to
the diminishing marginal utility of money. For planning costs, harm increases
on the margin due to finite slack resulting in increasing marginal planning
costs.
Looking first to risk aversion, the diminishing marginal utility of money
means that any given amount of risk will be more harmful when allocated to an
individual with less money and less harmful when allocated to an individual
with more money. To illustrate, for a taxpayer with an annual income of
$10,000, the possibility of that income increasing or decreasing by $2,000
constitutes a very large risk. Yet if that same risk is instead allocated to another
taxpayer with an annual income of $200,000, the $2,000 risk becomes much
smaller as a percentage of income. The first taxpayer would need to make
significant changes to her consumption portfolio in response to losing 20% of
her income. In contrast, the second taxpayer would be far less affected by the
need to decrease her consumption by only 1%. If the two taxpayers are
otherwise identical-except for their differing monetary resources-the first
taxpayer stands to lose far more expected utility from the volatility than does
the second taxpayer. 16 9
A similar result follows for planning costs, as long as there is a connection
between an individual's monetary resources and her level of slack or reserves.
Although this connection is obviously not perfect, when abstracting across an

167. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
168. For an exception that demonstrates the general rule, this result might not apply if the
taxes raised to fund the additional spending were head taxes-taxes that take the same dollar
amount from each taxpayer. Or, somewhat more plausibly, if only user fees and licenses were
raised to pay for additional spending, these revenue sources might be sufficiently regressive so as
to make the net effect nonredistributive. But raising tax rates on the margin for the major-broad
based state taxes (e.g., sales, income, and property) to fund additional state spending in the major
categories will almost certainly be redistributive.
169. Stated more formally, the utility loss that the first taxpayer would experience is higher
than the utility loss that the second taxpayer would experience, as the utility-to-dollar values are
higher for the first taxpayer than for the second taxpayer.
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entire state population, it seems reasonable to conclude that those with higher
income levels will also have more slack built into their budgets.1 7 0 After all, the
more income one has, the more one can afford to spend, and the more
opportunity there is to reallocate one's resources across spending categories
when faced with a downturn. Hence, the planning costs caused by fiscal
volatility are also likely to be more harmful when allocated to poorer taxpayers
than when allocated to wealthier taxpayers.
The indirect risk-spreading effects of redistributing fiscal volatility
function much like the direct planning-cost effects. Indirect risk spreading
occurs when volatility is allocated to individuals who are better able to save,
borrow, or use third-party insurance. For instance, by saving during upturns
(and using the saved funds to maintain consumption during downturns), an
individual can smooth her consumption over time and thus mitigate the harmful
effects of fiscal volatility. Borrowing during downturns (and paying off the
borrowing during upturns) likewise accomplishes consumption-smoothing,
thereby mitigating the harmful effects of fiscal volatility. Finally, the use of
third-party insurance transfers volatility from the insured individual to other
economic actors (who may reside out of state).
Empirically, wealthier taxpayers are both more able and more likely than
poorer taxpayers to save during upturns, borrow during downturns, and
purchase third-party insurance. It is well known that the wealthy tend to save
more than the poor and thus have greater savings available to smooth
consumption during downturns.172 The wealthy do not necessarily borrow more
than the poor, but they have a greater ability to access capital markets if they
wish to do so.' 73 Finally, although directly purchasing insurance against
downturns is not common, the wealthy can effectively purchase insurance
through the use of options, derivatives, annuities, and other financial
instruments. 174
Consequently, redistributing volatility from the poor to the wealthy
accomplishes both direct and indirect risk spreading. Since state tax and
170. The move here is similar to the logic typically used to justify making interpersonal
utility comparisons based on the diminishing marginal utility of money. There may well be some
wealthy taxpayer who derives more utility from a marginal dollar than does some poor taxpayer,
but when abstracting across an entire population, it seems reasonable to conclude that wealthy
taxpayers as a class will derive less utility from a marginal dollar than will poor taxpayers as a
class. Similarly, wealthy taxpayers as a class should have more slack.
171. Indeed, the direct planning cost effects and the indirect risk-spreading effects are
perhaps inextricably intertwined, as borrowing, saving, and the use of third-party insurance are
both mechanisms for indirect risk spreading and also forms of slack.
172. Richard Blundell, Luigi Pistaferri & Ian Preston, Partial Insurance, Information, and
Consumption Dynamics (Inst. for Fiscal Stud., Working Paper No. W02/16, 2002), available at
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/2002.
173. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. REG. 121 (2004); Ronald J. Mann &
Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REv. 855, 886-95 (2007).
174. The number of individuals insuring through these methods is probably small, but there
is no doubt that these techniques are more available to the wealthy than to the poor.
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spending programs are redistributive on the margin, fluctuating tax rates as the
primary response to fiscal volatility accomplishes more risk spreading than
does fluctuating spending levels.
2. ComparingPublic-SpendingActivities to Private-SectorEconomic Activities

When comparing taxpayers to the beneficiaries of public spending
programs, the focus is on differences between individual state citizens. Yet it is
also possible to examine the risk-spreading effects of responses to fiscal
volatility from the perspective of a representative taxpayer. Even if all state
citizens were identical-or if state fiscal policy was not redistributivefluctuating tax rates would accomplish more risk spreading than would
fluctuating spending levels.
As a starting point, one might think that the principle of risk spreading
would call for fiscal volatility to be allocated to public-spending programs
rather than to private-sector economic activities. After all, downturns occur
when the private sector is already suffering due to economic volatility. Why not
allocate some of this volatility to the public sector through spending reductions
and tax cuts?
Although the intuition behind this conclusion is correct, it is nonetheless
misguided. Certainly, public-sector spending should not be completely shielded
from the effects of volatility. Spending cuts will likely form a portion of the
optimal response to volatility during downturns. However, this intuition ignores
the impact that deviations in growth have on state revenues: a 1% reduction in
private-sector economic activity results in considerably more than a 1%
reduction in tax revenues. According to one estimate for the combined fifty
states, excluding legislative changes, each 1%deviation in GDP growth below
its trend reduces total state revenues by 2.5%.17s
The reason that tax revenues are several times more volatile than state
economic activity is that the underlying tax base is not overall state economic
activity. Instead, the tax bases for most of the major state-level taxes are
considerably more volatile than is state economic activity.176 Most
dramatically, business-level income taxes are only incurred when businesses
earn profits.17 7 During an economic downturn, many businesses will show
losses or only minimal profits, and thus will not pay significant business-level
income taxes. The same phenomenon holds true to a lesser extent for individual
income taxes, particularly for the self-employed. Deductions are likely to
remain steady during downturns while gross earnings decrease, leading to a
reduction in taxable income. Moreover, for states that tax capital gains,
taxpayers will tend to realize more losses in their capital gains income during
175. Brinner et al., supra note 49, at 60-63.
176. Id.
177. In contrast, a gross receipts tax or a value added tax (VAT) would be due regardless of
profitability.
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downturns and greater returns during booms.
Even the revenues derived from state sales taxes are typically more
volatile than overall economic activity, as state sales taxes tend to exempt
services that are more heavily consumed during downturns, as well as often
exempting other necessary items like food and medical expenses.' 78 The
manufactured consumer goods that are most heavily taxed under most state
sales tax systems tend to be purchased more during upturns than in
downturns.1 79
Hence, with the notable exception of property taxes, the major state tax
systems are all considerably more volatile than overall state economic
activity. As noted previously, state tax revenues have been estimated to be
two-and-a-half times more volatile than gross state products.' 8' In states that
rely heavily on income taxes and capital gains taxes, like California, this ratio
is even more extreme.1 82
Consequently, reallocating fiscal volatility more evenly across the public
and private sectors should further both direct and indirect risk spreading. Direct
risk spreading is achieved when volatility is spread as widely as possible across
individuals or sectors of the economy. All else being equal, the direct riskspreading principle would thus call for fiscal volatility to be allocated across
the public and private sectors in proportion to the size of both sectors as a
percent of gross state product. Yet without tax rate adjustments, the public
sector in a typical state will be forced to absorb more than twice as much
volatility as the private sector. In order to correct this imbalance, the state must
adjust tax rates as the economy cycles, raising rates during downturns and
lowering them during upturns.
The principle of indirect risk spreading calls for an even further
reallocation of volatility away from the public sector and toward the private
sector. Indirect risk spreading is furthered by allocating volatility to actors who
are better able to save, borrow, insure, or efficiently reallocate volatility across
subprograms. Due to the legal and political constraints on public-sector
activities, private-sector economic actors are better able to engage in all of
these methods for mitigating the harmful effects of volatility than are publicsector spending programs.

178. See Kirk J. Stark, The Uneasy Casefor Extending the Sales Tax to Services, 30 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 435, 440-41 (2003).
179. See id. at 447-48.
180. For a more in depth discussion of the factors inherent in state level tax systems that
contribute to revenue volatility exceeding of economic volatility, see Russell S. Sobel & Gary A.
Wagner, Cyclical Variability in State Government Revenue: Can Tax Reform Reduce It?, 29 ST.
TAX NOTES 569 (2003).

181. Brinner et al., supra note 49, at 60-63.
182. See Vasch6 & Williams, supra note 21, at 39 (estimating that California's short-term
revenue elasticity was 3.51 between fiscal years 1992 and 2004).
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To begin explaining why, legal constraints limit the ability of publicThese constraints do not
sector administrators to engage in borrowing.
always preclude borrowing, but they often impose burdensome limitationssuch as the need to seek voter approval-that are not similarly placed on
private-sector managers.184 And, while public-sector administrators are less
legally constrained when it comes to saving or insuring, the political dynamics
of the budgeting process create strong disincentives to taking these steps. The
budgets for public-sector programs are set politically, whereas private-sector
budgets are often determined (directly or indirectly) by the market.
Consequently, public-sector managers are trained to demonstrate the need for
more funding in order to protect their budgets.185 Saving and insuring are not
usually possible within the dynamics of this budgeting game.1 86
The political budgeting process also interferes with the ability of publicsector managers to allocate the effects of volatility efficiently across
subprograms. When downturns force budget cuts, public-sector managers face
incentives to allocate the cuts to politically salient portions of their budgets in
an attempt to protect their budgets during subsequent rounds of cuts."' Often,
this dynamic means that public managers allocate cuts to the budget areas in
which the cuts result in more costs on the whole, rather than to the budget lines
that can absorb the cuts most efficiently.
Of course, large businesses are not completely immune to politics or to
the sort of budgeting games that pervasively affect public-sector spending. But
there is usually better oversight within private-sector organizations, and the
motivating force of market competition tempers the harmful effects of these
political dynamics. Even most liberal economists generally agree that the
private sector is more efficient at producing goods and services, except for
public goods that would not be produced without government.188 The same
market forces that make private-sector production more efficient than
government production-and that more generally justify capitalism as a means
of economic ordering-also lead the private sector to mitigate the harmful
effects of economic volatility more efficiently.
As an example of how budgetary politics can exacerbate the harm from
spending fluctuations, political dynamics frequently cause state social

183. Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and
State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 915-18 (2003); Super, supra note 48, at 2605-07.

184.
185.

See Briffault, supra note 183, at 915-18.
See, e.g., David N. Figlio & Arthur O'Sullivan, The Local Response to Tax Limitation

Measures: Do Local Governments Manipulate Voters to Increase Revenues?, 44 J.L. & EcON.

233 (2001).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188.

See Robert Whaples, Do Economists Agree on Anything? Yes!, THE EcONOMISTs'

VOICE, Nov. 2006, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss9/artl (surveying economists' opinions on
a variety of issues related to markets and government regulation).

790

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:749

insurance programs to bear a disproportionate share of budget cuts during
downturns. These programs are especially poor candidates for absorbing the
harmful effects of fiscal volatility. State social insurance programs are intended
to mitigate the risk of economic misfortune by assisting taxpayers during
periods of particular hardship. To function effectively, these programs need to
spend more resources during economic downturns, when potential program
recipients are especially likely to have suffered hardship. Unfortunately, state
governments have historically reduced funding for social insurance programs
during periods of economic adversity only to restore funding again during
periods of strong economic growth.
It would be irrational to purchase an umbrella that only functions during
sunny days. Depriving social insurance programs of funding during downturns
and increasing funding during upturns is equally irrational. An essential
purpose of these programs is to insure against risks; introducing uncertainty to
this insurance function makes the insurance considerably less valuable. When
funding levels fluctuate, many potential social insurance beneficiaries with
strong needs are denied assistance during downturns, while less needy
recipients receive benefits during upturns. 190
Comparing public-sector spending activities to private-sector economic
activities thus further reveals that tax-rate adjustments accomplish greater risk
spreading than do spending fluctuations. Increasing the use of tax-rate
adjustments as state economies cycle would mitigate some of the harm caused
by fiscal volatility.
C Conclusionsand Caveats

Both when comparing taxpayers to spending beneficiaries, and when
comparing private-sector economic activities to public sector spending, the
result is the same. Adjusting tax rates accomplishes more risk spreading than
does fluctuating government spending levels. Moreover, the normative force of
these arguments is cumulative; from a baseline of allocating fiscal volatility
equally to tax and spending adjustments, each argument pushes the optimum
further toward the direction of larger tax-rate adjustments and smaller spending
fluctuations.
Nevertheless, the optimal response to fiscal volatility is likely to include
some amount of spending fluctuation. The harm from allocating risk to any
individual actor increases on the margin. The arguments here support allocating
the majority of volatility to tax-rate adjustments. That said, at some point,
continually increasing the magnitude of tax-rate adjustments will cause more
harm than would maintaining some degree of spending fluctuations. This
189. The analysis here partially draws on the writings of David Super, supra note 48, at
2630. Note that although the market could theoretically fund some of these programs, moral
hazard problems may make governments more efficient providers of these programs.
190. See Super, supra note 48, at 2611-14.
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Article makes no attempt to quantify its risk-spreading arguments. Instead, it
merely argues that tax-rate adjustments should form the primary response to
fiscal volatility. The question of whether "primary" means 60% of coping
responses or 90% is left for future research.
Moreover, both the optimal amount of tax-rate adjustments and the choice
of which taxes to adjust depend on structural features of state economies. The
degree to which taxpayers are likely to relocate across state lines or play timing
games across tax years in response to tax hikes is an important factor in
determining the desirability of tax-rate adjustments with respect to these
groups. In deciding which taxes to adjust, states will often face a dilemma in
which the taxes that most affect upper-income taxpayers (such as progressive
income taxes or capital gains taxes) are also the most likely to be avoided
through relocation or timing games. Yet many of the advantages of selecting
tax-rate adjustments over spending fluctuations derive from progressivity. This
Part has argued that-as compared to fluctuating government spending-even
adjusting the rates of a regressive tax like the sales tax is beneficial to lowerincome taxpayers. But adjusting the rates of more progressive tax instruments
achieves even greater risk-spreading advantages.
One approach to balancing these competing considerations would be to
create a new statewide property tax that could be adjusted to have positive tax
rates during downturns (so as to offset the reduced revenues being generated by
other state tax instruments) while providing a tax refund during upturns. The
new property tax could include circuit breakers in order to increase its
progressivity.191 The desirability of creating a new statewide property tax, as

compared to other methods for enacting tax-rate adjustments, is a question
largely left for future research. 192 For now, it suffices to reiterate that not all
tax-rate adjustments accomplish risk spreading. This Article has only examined
the tradeoffs between allocating volatility to broad-based tax-rate adjustments,
as compared to across-the-board spending adjustments.' 93 The questions of how
best to allocate tax rate adjustments amongst the various state tax instruments,
and how best to allocate spending adjustments amongst state spending
programs, are likewise left for future research.

191.

See John H. Bowman, Daphne A. Kenyon, Adam Langley & Bethany P. Paquin,

Property Tax Circuit Breakers: Fair and Cost-Effective Relief, 53 ST. TAx NOTEs 235 (2009).

192. Some further discussion of this issue can be found in Part Il.B.
193. Another possible approach for coping with fiscal volatility is to broaden tax bases
during downturns while narrowing them during upturns. This approach is similar to adjusting tax
rates in that it results in tax burdens fluctuating across the economic cycle, but it accomplishes this
through a different mechanism. However, broadening and narrowing a tax base will generally be
suboptimal from a risk-spreading perspective. Changing the elements of a tax base typically
affects a much narrower group of taxpayers than does adjusting the rates of the tax instrument,
thus causing the effects of volatility to be more concentrated. Additionally, adjusting the elements
of a tax base is likely to engender more undesirable game playing on the part of taxpayers than
would adjusting tax rates.
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III
INSTITUTIONAL-DESIGN POLICY
Part II analyzed how states should respond to the fiscal volatility created
by economic cycles interacting with their balanced-budget constraints. In
contrast to the current trend of primarily fluctuating government expenditures,
Part II argued that states should instead rely more on adjusting the rates of their
broad-based taxes. States should raise their tax rates during economic
downturns and lower their tax rates during periods of economic growth.
Part III argues that states could make tax-rate adjustments more common
and expenditure fluctuations rarer by changing how the terms "tax cuts" and
"tax hikes" are defined by the states' legislative processes. Under the states'
current institutional frameworks, legislated changes to state tax rates become
presumptive changes to steady-state policies. Whereas most government
expenditures need to be reauthorized annually through acts of the legislature,
tax rates remain in effect once passed and are automatically reauthorized until
explicitly changed by some future act of legislation.194
Most voters and political actors care more about their steady-state policy
preferences than about how volatility is allocated around the steady state. 195
Even if they could be persuaded by the arguments in Part II, conservatives
would be unlikely to accept tax hikes during downturns and liberals would be
unlikely to approve of tax cuts during upturns, unless they had guarantees that
these policy changes would be reversed after the end of the economic
circumstances that triggered them. Moreover, since the governing coalition in
control during a downturn might have lost power by the next upturn, governing
coalitions have even further reason to care more about their impact on steadystate policies than about optimal responses to volatility. A governing coalition
could not credibly call a tax hike made during a downturn a response to
volatility that will be undone during the next upturn, as the subsequent
governing coalition might not play along. Hence, to improve how states cope
with fiscal volatility, we need a means for separating the policy question of
choosing what to adjust as a response to fiscal volatility from the policy
question of setting the steady-state levels of taxes and spending.
We tend to think of the terms "tax cuts" and "tax hikes" as having set
meanings. Although there are circumstances in which politicians argue about
whether or not a policy change should be labeled as a "tax cut" or a "tax hike,"
there is generally widespread agreement that most increases in state tax rates
should be called "tax hikes" while most decreases in these rates should be
called "tax cuts."' 96 Yet the very notion of legislated changes-as embodied in
194. Tax laws function like entitlement spending in that they remain in effect until
explicitly altered. Discretionary general account spending must be rebudgeted annually.
195. This can be inferred from how rarely the political debate focuses on fiscal volatility
issues as compared to questions related to the steady-state levels for taxes and spending.
196. The exceptions to this maxim only serve to support the general rule. For instance,
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terms like "tax cuts" and "tax hikes," or even "spending cuts" and "spending
hikes"-requires a notion of a default policy outcome that would have been enacted in the absence of the legislated change. 197 One can only measure changes
from the policy status quo by referencing a baseline for what constitutes the
status quo. Since balanced-budget constraints make it impossible to hold the
entirety of state budgetary policies constant as the economy cycles, there can be
no ontological definitions for labels like "tax cuts" and "tax hikes."l 9 8
One dictionary defines a tax cut as "a reduction in the amount of taxes
taken by the government."' 9 9 But the amount of revenue the government
receives from taxes is constantly changing. Sometimes these changes occur due
to legislative fiddling with tax-rate structures or with the rules for calculating
tax bases. At other times the government increases or decreases its revenue
intake due to evolving economic conditions or to changing responses to tax
provisions. 200 Nearly any government program that affects the economy can
Democrats and Republicans dispute whether allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire should be
viewed as "raising taxes." The frame here is contestable because the parties can argue about
whether the relevant baseline includes extension of the temporary tax cuts. But were the
Democrats to propose raising tax rates further-beyond the pre-Bush levels-there would be no
doubt that this would be considered a "tax hike." Whether overall revenues are increasing or
declining due to economic circumstances is not currently viewed as a relevant consideration in
whether a policy change is called a "tax cut" or a "tax hike." See infra notes 203-205 and
accompanying text.
197. One might argue that general account spending does not have baselines in the same
sense as does tax legislation, as general account spending must be reauthorized each year. But this
argument is not fully persuasive as most general account spending is reauthorized without full
review and changes from the previous year's levels of spending are usually viewed as "spending
cuts" or "spending hikes." Zero-base budgeting is seldom implemented in practice.
198. The difference between state general account spending and federal discretionary
spending is that the federal government can incur deficits. Hence, at the federal level, revenue
volatility (the default response to economic cycles under a tax-rates baseline) causes the deficit to
automatically grow and shrink unless the legislature proactively adjusts tax or spending policies.
In contrast, at the state level, there is no actual default fiscal policy. The tax-rates baseline means
that any legislated change to tax rates is coded as a "tax cut" or "tax hike," but any legislated
change to spending will similarly be coded as a "spending cut" or a "spending hike." See supra
note 194. Revenue volatility forces states to adjust either their tax or spending policies as their
economies cycle, but the states must actively decide which specific policies to adjust.
This Article focuses on the definition of "tax cuts" and "tax hikes" because these terms are
more salient within the current political environment-as reflected by the increasing rarity of "tax
hikes." The motivating idea is that, as voters appear to increasingly be making decisions based on
whether politicians are seen as voting for "tax cuts" or "tax hikes," we should strive to make the
content of these terms reflect what voters actually care about. Or, alternatively, we should strive to
eliminate any negative consequences of the increased salience of these terms that does not result
from the reasons voters care about the terms.
Voters presumably care about these terms based on their preferences for steady-state policy,
not based on preferences for how fiscal volatility should be allocated. Therefore, we should define
these terms so that the terms convey the information voters seek about legislated changes to
steady-state fiscal policy (the size-of-government decision), without negatively affecting how
states respond to cyclical economic fluctuations (the fiscal volatility decision).
Tax
cut,
word
the
of
meaning
Define
199. InvestorDictionary.com,
http://www.investordictionary.com/definition/tax+cut.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
200. For instance, the California State Department of Finance and the State's Legislative
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alter the amount of revenue collected through taxes. But if we labeled any
change in government policy that might alter the amount of revenue generated
though taxation as a "tax cut" or "tax hike," these terms would become
meaningless.
As such, we can only determine the appropriate baselines for terms like
"tax cuts" and "tax hikes" by making meta-decisions about what aspects of our
budgetary policy we would like to hold constant as a default. This institutionaldesign-level choice of baselines determines which policy outcomes become
presumptive responses to fiscal volatility, and which become presumptive
201
changes to steady-state policies.
This Part argues that states should adjust their tax baselines-the default
tax policies that are enacted in the absence of explicit legislative change-in
order to make tax rate adjustments more common and expenditure fluctuations
rarer. This Part first explains why the choice of baselines matters, reviewing
literature from positive political theory and from behavioral public finance.
Second, this Part outlines alternative baselines that might be used in place of
tax rates and briefly discusses how states might implement these alternative
baselines.
A. Why the Choice ofBaselines Matters

Although it is almost tautological to say that we could not use terms like
"tax cuts" or "tax hikes" without a baseline for defining those terms, this alone
is not enough to conclude that the choice of baselines actually matters. For
instance, we might imagine legislatures determining their preferred levels of
taxation and spending each year without reference to prior-year policy. If
legislatures determined their tax and spending policies anew each year from
scratch-without influence by any policy status quo-then the choice of
baselines would not affect policy outcomes. Instead of focusing on policy
changes, such as tax cuts and tax hikes, the political debate would be
dominated by the discussion of desired outcomes.

Analysts Office analyze the effects of a number of economic variables on the amount of tax
revenue collected by the State, including trends in consumer and business spending, housing,
employment, profits, and income distributions. See Vasch6 and Williams, supra note 21, at 40.
201. At this point, it may be helpful to clarify the difference between adopting a new tax
baseline and adopting a tax expenditure limit. Numerous states have adopted tax expenditure
limits in order to prevent legislatures from raising taxes or to limit the circumstances under which
legislatures can raise taxes. An example of a tax expenditure limit is a rule requiring that a
supermajority of a legislature vote to approve a tax hike. Whereas tax expenditure limits are
designed to bias the evolution of steady-state policies (usually, against raising taxes and
spending), the choice of baselines is only meant to influence which aspects of steady-state policies
fluctuate in response to fiscal volatility. Adopting a new baseline should not prevent legislatures
from adjusting steady-state policies as they desire. Instead, adopting a new baseline only alters the
mechanism through which legislatures change steady-state policies.
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However, "[a] core feature of humans is that we are highly attuned to
changes in our circumstances, not merely the absolute levels." 2 0 2 An
examination of campaign advertisements or political newspaper stories will
quickly reveal that political actors behave as though labels matter. Rarely do
politicians try to convince voters about the proper size of taxation or spending
as a percent of GDP. Instead, politicians accuse their opponents of wanting to
"raise your taxes" and the media dutifully reports the number of times a
politician has voted for "tax cuts" or "tax hikes." It is no accident that the No
New Taxes Pledge commits its signers to "oppose any and all efforts to
increase ... tax rates," rather than committing them to attempt to bring the
overall level of taxation to some targeted size. 203
Alternatively, a skeptic might think that voters care only about their
individual tax rates, and will consider any changes to these tax rates to be "tax
cuts" or "tax hikes." Yet voters repeatedly express strong opinions about tax
policy changes that do not affect them directly-as evidenced by the political
salience of the debate over the estate tax (or "death tax"), despite this tax
affecting only a small portion of the voting populace. Moreover, from the
perspective of policy outcomes, what matters are which tax changes voters
blame on individual politicians and legislators. Voters may dislike their tax
rates going up, and may view this as a "tax hike." But when tax rates go up
without any sitting legislator voting in favor of the tax-rate hike, voter anger
may remain unfocused and may thus have minimal political impact.
Consider the debate at the federal level about whether the opponents of
making the Bush tax cuts permanent are sponsoring tax hikes or simply
opposing new tax cuts.204 The answer to this question depends on whether our
baseline is current law with the Bush tax cuts extended or current law without
the tax cuts extended. Notably, the appropriate label is controversial, with both
sides viewing the choice of labels as significant. Also notable is that while
many Democrats feel comfortable advocating for the Bush tax cuts to expire,
far fewer Democrats are openly calling for taxes to be raised above the preBush levels.
A similar dynamic became a major point of controversy during the 2004
presidential election. 20 5 Democrats and Republicans proposed different frames
for understanding Kerry's tax plan. The Kerry campaign claimed it wanted to
202.

Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. EcON. REV.

657, 662 (2002).
203. Gale & Kelly, supra note 35, at 198.
204. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Turning Slogans Into Tax Policy, 27
VA. TAX REV. 747, 759--61 (2008).
205. See LEONARD E. BURMAN & JEFFREY ROHALY, TAX POLICY CENTER, SENATOR
KERRY'S TAX PROPOSALS (2004), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1000634 Kerry
Plan.pdf (describing Kerry's tax proposals); Adam Nagourney, Political Memo; Some Candidates
Quick to Urge Tax-Cut Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, May. 30, 2003, at A24 (describing statements about
whether the Bush Tax Cuts should be repealed by both Democrats and Republicans).
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repeal some of the tax cuts previously enacted by the Bush administration,
while the Bush campaign claimed that Kerry wanted to raise taxes. Both
campaigns were referring to the same substantive policy proposals, only their
choice of labels differed, with each party appearing to believe that its preferred
label was politically advantageous for its side. Again, it is worth noting that
Kerry called only for repealing previously enacted tax cuts. If labels and
baselines were irrelevant, the Kerry campaign would not have needed to
distinguish between repealing the Bush tax cuts and simply raising taxes. This
discussion of the Bush tax cuts shows that political actors care about the
baselines used to measure tax policy, and that these baselines are at least
sometimes contestable. As Daniel Shaviro argues, "labels can matter even if
they are arbitrary and potentially misleading ...

. politicians fight about

labeling a particular provision as a tax increase or a spending cut, even if
substantively the classification makes no difference."20 6
For another example, although Regan's 1981 tax package slashed the
marginal tax rates and introduced new tax incentives for businesses and real
estate, many astute commentators have argued that the legislation's "most
significant enduring feature was the elimination of rate bracket creep through
inflation adjustments." 2 07 According to Michael Graetz, "These inflation
adjustments eliminated the sizeable automatic income tax increases that had
been produced even at relatively low levels of inflation. The lasting revenue
impact of this change is dramatic-far greater than is generally known."2 0 8
By indexing the tax code for inflation, the 1981 Tax Act changed the
baseline for determining tax cuts and tax hikes. Prior to 1981, the default
outcome in the absence of legislative action brought additional revenues as
inflation moved taxpayers to higher brackets. After 1981, these "automatic tax
increases" were abolished, and Congress was no longer able to obtain the same
yearly revenue increases without explicitly voting to raise taxes. 2 0 9 The
adoption of this new tax baseline through inflation indexing dramatically

206.

SHAVIRO, supra note 123, at 71.

207.

Michael J. Graetz, Tax Policy at the Beginning of the Clinton Administration, 10

YALE J. ON REG. 561, 563 (1993).
208. Id.
209. Before indexing, inflation caused taxpayers' income to be taxed at increasingly higher
rates over time as greater portions of their income moved into higher tax brackets. This effect was
so pronounced in the late 1970s that the "change from 1976 to 1981 represented an increase of
23% in the real level of the income-tax burden." Edward J.McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax,
41 UCLA L. REv. 1861, 1896-97 (1994). By any holistic measure, the level of taxation increased
during this period. Yet these changes were not generally viewed as government-sponsored tax
hikes. "Indeed, the two major Carter era tax bills, the 1977 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act
and the 1978 Revenue Act, were each billed, projected, and expected to be tax reductions." Id. at
1897 (emphasis in original). With nominal tax rates functioning as the tax baseline, the Carter
administration was credited with passing tax cuts even though the real level of taxation was
increasing. The absence of indexing allowed the government's revenue intake to rise without
Congress or the Carter administration taking significant political heat for passing tax hikes.
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altered the dynamics of the federal tax policy debate. 2 10
As these examples demonstrate, baselines and labels matter in politics and
political entrepreneurs are sometimes able to change the previously dominant
labels. The advocates of inflation indexing argued for decades that the pre-1981
baseline for the federal income tax was harmful. By 1981, they had finally
convinced enough important political actors to have their preferred baselines
partially enacted into the federal legislative process. 211
Looking outside the tax context for a final example, the fact that payouts
from the federal Social Security program are indexed to growth in wages
partially accounts for the rapid increase in the size of the program as a percent
of GDP. When the Bush Administration called for Social Security payouts to
be indexed to inflation instead, there was uproar over this attempt at "benefit
cuts." In the words of Daniel Shaviro:
The choice of a baseline is inevitably arbitrary, or at least subject to
differing interpretations. By having the rules they do, however, Social
Security and Medicare effectively end any such dispute and dictate the
choice of a relatively generous baseline. The Bush Administration
learned this the hard way during the 2005 Social Security debate, when
it found few takers for its argument that eliminating wage indexing for
high wage earners, and henceforth pegging their benefits just to the
inflation rate, was not really a benefit cut, as it would keep current
benefits constant in real terms. 212
If Congress ignored baselines and re-determined the appropriate size of
Social Security benefits each year from scratch, or if voters only paid attention
to changes in the actual size of their Social Security payments, then the Bush
Administration's proposal would have made no difference. The widespread
controversy that surrounded the proposal thus strongly suggests that political
analysts believe that the choice of baselines can affect policy outcomes. To
again quote Shaviro, structural fiscal language-like baselines-functions as
"formal rules of the game that participants can manipulate but not openly
flout.... [Structural fiscal language] tilts and constrains real policy choices,
and induces political actors to befuddle themselves even as they labor to
befuddle constituencies whose support they need."213

210.

AARON B. WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 240-97

(2d ed., 1992).
211. The advocates of inflation indexing were only partially successful; many important
elements of the federal income tax remain unindexed-most notably, the alternative minimum tax.
For further discussion, see Richard J. Kovach, Technical and Policy Standards for Inflation
Adjustments Under the Internal Revenue Code, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603 (2008); James C.
Young, Inflation Adjustments Affecting Individual Taxpayers in 2003: Analysis and Commentary,
96 TAX NOTES 1895 (2002).
212. See SHAVIRO, supra note 123, at 159.
213. Id. at 11.
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As the above examples indicate, baselines in the tax and spending
contexts are already the subject of considerable debate.2 14 This Part contributes
to the literature on tax baselines by pointing out another arbitrary feature of the
baselines we currently use for most state and federal taxes. Currently, the
default legislative outcome is for tax rates to remain constant as the economy
cycles, even as revenues rise during upturns and fall during downturns. There is
essentially no literature discussing this choice of baseline. Yet this baseline is
partially responsible for states preferring spending fluctuations over tax-rate
adjustments as their primary means of coping with fiscal volatility.
The remainder of this Section briefly discusses two theoretical literatures
that provide explanations for why the choice of baselines affects the outcomes
reached by the ordinary political process.
1. PositivePolitical Theory

The first explanation for why the choice of baselines matters comes from
positive political theory. 215 Our democratic political system-both at the state
and federal levels-is characterized by numerous veto points. Bills do not
become laws unless passed by both legislative chambers (in the majority of
states with bicameral legislatures). Then, if the legislative chambers pass the
bill with less than a supermajority, the bill is exposed to the possibility of a
gubernatorial veto. Moreover, in most state legislatures, there are numerous
additional actors, such as committee chairpersons, who can block the adoption
of new legislation.
A naive view of democracy might assume that median voters' preferences
are always enacted into law. Yet individual legislators and the governor are
each elected by a distinct subset of a state's voters. Predictably, political actors
disagree with one another about which policies should be enacted. Legislative
proposals thus typically require the support of more than a mere 51% majority
to become law. A proposal will not become law unless either every political
actor with the ability to block new legislation supports it, or other political
actors give sufficient support to override attempts to block the proposal.

214. For other innovative proposals involving tax and spending baselines, see Leonard
Burman, Robert Shiller, Gregory Leiserson & Jeffery Rohaly, The Rising Tide Tax System,
Indexing the Tax System for Changes in Inequality (Mar. 22, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author); JASON FURMAN, BROOKINGS INST., COPING WITH DEMOGRAPHIC UNCERTAINTY

(2007), http://wagner.nyu.edu/performance/socialsecurity/demographicuncertainty.pdf
215. See, e.g., Alesina, supra note 58, at 12 ("The academic literature has pointed out that
the fragmentation of a political system is an obstacle to the implementation of the appropriate
fiscal decisions, particularly when various shocks require a swift fiscal response. In the most
general sense, political fragmentation is a situation in which many political groups have a voice in
fiscal decisions, and many have veto power. The point is not that fragmentation necessarily
creates budget deficits, but that fragmentation creates obstacles to policy changes, because it
becomes more difficult to reach agreements about corrective fiscal measures.").
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Agenda-setting powers exacerbate this effect. Legislatures have neither
the time nor the resources to deliberate fully over every possible legislative
change. Even a new proposal that the majority and all veto players support
might not become law if time runs out on the legislative calendar.
With regard to tax baselines, all of these effects are magnified in the many
states with tax-expenditure limits making it more difficult to raise taxes.2 16 For
instance, in states that require supermajority votes to raise taxes, the difference
between tax changes that need to be specifically voted on and tax changes that
result from economic growth are particularly pronounced.
Under a tax-rates baseline, the default policy outcome is for revenues to
decline during downturns and to increase during upturns. If the majority wishes
to depart from this default outcome, it needs to get its proposed change through
all relevant veto points. Even if only a minority of a legislature is strongly
opposed to tax hikes during downturns, this minority may still have its way,
particularly if there is a supermajority requirement for raising taxes or the
minority has the support of an important veto player.
In contrast, under a revenue-targets baseline, the default outcome is for
tax rates to rise during downturns and fall during upturns. Again, if the majority
does not like this default outcome, any proposed change must pass through all
the relevant veto points. Ultimately, a sufficiently strong majority in favor of
overturning a default outcome will succeed in enacting its preferences into law.
Nevertheless, baselines matter because there is often a range of policy changes
that would have the support of the majority of voters but are not supported by
political actors wielding veto powers. When looking at tax policy specifically,
the choice of baselines determines which veto players' preferences become
law. The veto players' preferences that are closest to the default option that the
baseline creates should determine the eventual policy outcome.
Baselines matter because any veto player who prefers the default policy
outcome to a proposed change can defeat the proposed change. The majority
must refashion its policy proposal so that all veto coalitions prefer the proposal
to the default option. Otherwise, the proposal will not succeed. By switching
the default option from holding tax rates constant to holding revenues constant,
a revenue-targets baseline should thus make tax-rate fluctuations more common
and expenditure fluctuations rarer.
2. BehavioralPublic Finance

The second body of literature that explains why baselines matter is
behavioral public finance, also known as political psychology. 2 17 Hundreds of
216. See Ellen Moule & Nicholas Weller, The Spread of Tax Revolt, the Diffusion of State
Tax and Expenditure Limits (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); James M. Poterba,
State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics, 102 J. POL.
EcON. 799 (1994).
217. See BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006).
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experiments and field studies have demonstrated that individuals exhibit what
is known as either "loss aversion," the "endowment effect," or the "status-quo
bias." 2 18 These three labels refer to related phenomena-that individuals dislike
losses more than they like gains, or that individual preferences are biased
toward whatever they view as the status quo.
Many theorists have argued that these phenomena apply to fiscal policy
changes, such that "tax cuts are not nearly as 'good,' from the standpoint of the
endowment effect and status quo bias, as tax increases are 'bad.' So a high-tax
baseline for defining changes can increase people's tax tolerance."219 Most
notably, Ed McCaffery and Jon Baron have confirmed that the fiscal policy
preferences of experimental subjects are biased in the direction of whatever
outcome they perceive to be the status quo.220 Voters are far more likely to
punish a politician for raising taxes than for failing to lower taxes. Of course,
just because a change of baselines alters the default legislative outcome does
not necessarily mean that it also alters voters' conceptions of the status quo.
Even under a revenue-targets baseline, voters might still notice when their tax
rates go up.
Yet voters do not blame all policy changes they dislike on elected
politicians. When the Federal Reserve hikes interest rates, even voters who
dislike high interest rates seldom blame Congress for allowing it to happen,
despite the fact that Congress could override the Federal Reserve's authorizing
statute at any time.221 Similarly, under a revenue-targets baseline, even voters
who notice their tax rates going up during downturns might come to view these
changes as a natural response to evolving economic conditions rather than as
tax hikes sponsored by the state legislature. Or, they might blame the changes
on the administrative board enacting the new rates. Once taxpayers become
accustomed to seeing tax rates fluctuate annually, even, in the absence of any
new tax legislation, they should eventually begin to understand the new
baseline. In any case, it is difficult to hold politicians accountable for changes
they do not propose. Even voters who want to blame politicians for allowing
tax rates to go up may not know which politicians to blame.
Under a revenue-targets baseline, tax rates rise during downturns without
any politician needing to vote specifically for a tax increase. There is reason to
think voters will be less averse to these automatic tax-rate increases than to taxrate increases that are specifically voted on by the legislature-tax-rate
218. See, e.g,. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1227 (2003); John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA / WTP Studies,
44 J. ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 426 (2002).
219. See SHAVIRO, supra note 123, at 26.
220. Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution,

52 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (2005).
221.

See ALAN S. BLINDER, CENTRAL BANKING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 55 (1999)

(claiming that Congress's need to pass a law to overturn the Federal Reserve's interest rate
decisions makes these "decisions, for all practical purposes, immune from reversal").
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increases that are clearly "tax hikes." Hence, adopting a revenue-targets
baseline should again make tax fluctuations more common and expenditure
fluctuations rarer.
Empirical studies of the "flypaper effect" buttress these theoretical
explanations for why baselines matter.2 2 2 The flypaper effect refers to the
hypothesis that additional money "sticks where it lands," such that, for
instance, federal government grants to state governments result in more state
spending increases than do equivalently sized federal payouts to the state's
citizens. A particularly relevant paper in this literature by Helen Ladd looks at
the changes to state tax systems that occurred due to the 1986 federal tax
reform.223 When the federal government broadened its income tax base, this
automatically broadened the income tax bases for those states that tied their
income-tax-base calculations to the federal rules, thus creating "windfall" tax
224
As Ladd explains, if the choice of
revenues for the states' governments.
baselines did not matter, "state officials would offset the windfalls by reducing
tax rates or restructuring the state revenue system to maintain spending and
state tax burdens in line with voter preferences."225 Hence, Ladd's finding "of a
flypaper effect for the large . .. windfalls means that state actions do not fully
offset the unintended windfall gains for state governments associated with
large-scale federal tax reform." 226 In other words, baselines matter because
state governments do not fully counteract default outcomes.
The empirical evidence thus corresponds with this Article's theoretical
prediction-baselines matter.227 Although legislatures do not simply follow
default policy outcomes, the choice of a default policy outcome exerts a
powerful pull on fiscal policy. By switching from tax-rates baselines to
revenue-targets baselines, states could increase their use of tax-rate adjustments
and decrease their reliance on spending fluctuations.
B. Alternatives to the Tax-Rates Baseline

There are at least three models for which aspects of a tax system could be
held constant throughout economic cycles: constant tax rates, constant revenue
targets, and constant spending needs.
222.

James R. Hines, Jr. & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, 9 J. ECON.

PERSP. 217 (1995) (summarizing the literature on the flypaper effect).
223. Helen F. Ladd, State Responses to the TRA86 Revenue Windfalls: A New Test of the
Flypaper Effect, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 82 (1993).

224. Id. at 82.
225. Id. at 83.
226. Id. at 101.
227. More generally, a sizeable empirical literature has concluded that fiscal institutions
"matter." See, e.g., James M. Poterba, Do Budget Rules Work? 0 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 5550, April 1996) ("Several distinct strands of empirical evidence, from the
U.S. federal experience with anti-deficit rules, from U.S. state experience with balanced budget
rules, and from international comparisons of budget outcomes in nations with different fiscal
institutions, suggest that fiscal institutions do matter.").
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Tax Rates Held
Constant

Revenue Targets
Held Constant

Spending Needs
Constant

(sales and income tax
systems)

(some property tax
systems)

(some federal grants
to states)

In the "tax rates" baseline on the left side of the spectrum above, tax rates
are held constant in the absence of legislated changes. Consequently, decreased
revenues becomes the default response to economic downturns, and increased
revenues becomes the default response to upturns. Any deviation from these
default responses requires legislative action and will typically be labeled as a
"tax hike" or a "tax cut." The left side of the spectrum depicts the general rule
governing most state and federal tax systems, with the exception of the
property tax systems in some states. In the "revenue-targets" baseline in the
middle of the spectrum-which roughly corresponds with the property tax
systems of twenty-two states-the amount of revenue raised is held constant as
the economy cycles, with tax rates automatically adjusted so as to maintain the
revenue targets. Finally, in the "spending needs" baseline on the right side of
the spectrum, tax rates are adjusted to maintain the spending goals of
government programs. For instance, some federal grants to states are based on
participation levels for the grant-funded spending programs-which often tend
to increase during economic downturns and decrease during upturns,
particularly for programs that provide poverty assistance or that fulfill a social
insurance function. A baseline tied to spending needs would automatically
adjust the tax rates in order to maintain the same funding per program
participant, or per other metric for spending needs.
This Section will proceed by first discussing how some states have moved
from tax-rates baselines to revenue-targets baselines for their local property
taxes. It will then discuss how alternative baselines might be implemented for
statewide taxes such as state sales and income tax systems.
1. "Truth-in-Taxation" Property Tax Systems

Since no government has ever implemented a baseline other than tax rates
for a sales or income tax, the best way to explain how an alternative baseline
might work for these taxes is to start by looking at the property tax systems of
the twenty-two states that have effectively adopted variations of revenue-target
baselines. These states vary greatly in how they have implemented their
alternative baselines, and local property taxes are sufficiently dissimilar from
statewide taxes that one should not put too much stake in these examples.
Nevertheless, these revenue-target-like property tax systems are the best real-
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world example of the use of a baseline other than tax rates.
The use of revenue-target-like baselines for property taxes began in the
1960s as part of a "Truth-in-Taxation" movement.22 8 The advocates of these
alternative property tax-like baselines were concerned that local governments
had been "automatically" receiving extra revenues as their local property values
increased, without local governments ever needing to explicitly raise taxes.229
The advocates of these measures were the same conservative groups that
promoted tax-expenditure limits in other states. 230 These groups viewed
themselves as calling for a softer form of tax-expenditure limit. 23 1 Yet the logic
behind their measures and the means in which they were implemented had the
effect of changing the state property tax systems from using tax-rate baselines
to using variations on revenue-target baselines. According to Robert Bland and
Phanit Laosirirat,
Truth in taxation, also known as full disclosure, was developed by the
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in
1962 as a method to reduce revenue windfalls in the wake of an en
masse reappraisal of property. It seeks to make local lawmakers more
accountable for tax increases by focusing taxpayers' attention on the
rate-setting process and not only on their property's reappraised value.
This is usually achieved by first informing citizens of the constant
yield rate (CYR), the tax rate that will produce the same amount of
revenue as last year when applied to this year's tax base. Then citizens
must be notified of a public hearing where they can question local
lawmakers on why a tax rate greater than the CYR should be adopted.
Unlike other tax limitation measures that impose statewide restrictions
on rates or levies, truth in taxation preserves local governments'
discretion to set rates that meet local expenditure preferences while
giving taxpayers an opportunity to scrutinize proposed [tax]
increases.
In other words, the purpose of the Truth-in-Taxation measures is to
change the default policy response created by rising property values from
holding tax rates constant while revenues go up, to holding revenues constant
while tax rates go down. Tax hikes are redefined as increases to "constant yield
rates"-the rates that, when applied to the new (more valuable) tax base, would
generate the same revenue as in the previous year. Effectively, tax hikes are
defined as increases in local government revenues, rather than as increases in
the actual tax rates applied to property values.

228. Robert L. Bland & Phanit Laosirirat, Tax Limitations to Reduce Municipal Property
Taxes: Truth in Taxation in Texas, 19 J. URB. AFF. 45, 45-49 (1997).
229. See id.
230. See id.
See id.
231.
232. Id. at 45-46.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

804

[Vol. 98:749

For an example of how these measures are given statutory authority,
consider the following language in the Texas State Constitution:
Subject to any exceptions prescribed by general law, the total amount
of property taxes imposed by a political subdivision in any year may
not exceed the total amount of property taxes imposed by that
subdivision in the preceding year unless the governing body of the
subdivision gives notice of its intent to consider an increase in taxes
and holds a public hearing on the proposed increase before it increases
those total taxes. 233
Again, the Texas Constitution defines an "increase in taxes" in reference
to the "total amount of property taxes" rather than in reference to the tax rates
previously applied to the property tax base. Here the institutional mechanism
for raising taxes requires the local government to give notice of its intent to
"increase taxes" and to hold a public hearing. This requirement applies when
the local government seeks to increase its property tax revenues from those
received in the prior year, not when the local government seeks to change its
tax rates.
The twenty-two states that have adopted these revenue-target-like
baselines for their property taxes differ in whether and how they index the
baseline. 234 Indexing is necessary because what it means for revenues to remain
"constant" is not entirely straightforward. States could hold their baselines
constant in real-dollar terms. Or states might index their baselines for inflation,
thus holding revenues constant in nominal dollars. As another alternative, states
could index their baselines for GDP growth, thus holding revenues constant as
a percent of GDP. States might even choose to index their baselines to grow at
a constant annual rate. How to index a baseline is an important question of
institutional design; however, there are no theoretically correct answers to this
question.
Like the indexing decision, the enforcement mechanisms for these
baselines differ among the states. 2 35 States could require only that the
government publicize any "tax increases," as defined by the revenue-targets
baseline, in local newspapers. Or states might allow taxpayers to sue in district
courts if they believe the local government administrators have not calculated
and published any "tax hikes" as defined by the new baselines in the manner
the statute demands. States could even require local governments to obtain
voter approval for any increase in the revenue targets, through ballot measures,
or allow petitions for citizen initiatives to rollback any such increases.

233. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 21(a). See also OFFICE OF THE TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB.
ACCOUNTS,
TRUTH-IN-TAXATION:
A
GUIDE
FOR
SETTING
TAX
RATES
(2005),

http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/proptax/tnt05/96-3 12.pdf.
234.

See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., SIGNIFICANT FEATURES

OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 151-67 (1995, 1977).
235. Id.
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Regardless, all of these measures have the effect of altering the baseline for
defining what constitutes a tax cut or a tax hike. All of the measures switch the
default policy response from increases in property tax values (the response that
occurs if the local governments do not take the required steps for passing a "tax
hike") to one where revenues remain constant while tax rates are lowered.
Unfortunately, the local property tax context is too dissimilar from the
statewide sales and income tax context for these measures to provide a concrete
guide for implementing a revenue-target baseline at the state level. There are at
least three major differences between the local property tax context and
statewide tax contexts that limit the value of these examples. First, government
agents determine the value of local property tax bases through property
appraisals. Second, property values have tended to increase over time, whereas
sales and income tax bases oscillate as the economy cycles. Third, local
government tax lawmaking relies on different institutions and procedures than
does state-level tax lawmaking.
Looking first at the issue of property appraisals, whereas the tax bases of
sales and income taxes fluctuate with economic cycles-as consumers purchase
more and less goods and as incomes go up and down-property tax bases
change in value partially due to the actions of government property appraisers.
In contrast to state sales and income taxes, as Cornia and Walters explain:
[N]othing in property tax practice and administration inherently
identifies and adjusts for changes in market value [changes in the tax
base]. To appraise or reappraise a property, assessors must act overtly
and estimate the sales price of each property as of the legal lien date.
The need to proactively establish the economic value of the base
makes the property tax different from other taxes where the value of
the base is established through observable
economic transactions (e.g.,
236
sales price of goods or annual income).
Because property tax bases change in value partially due to the action of
government agents, it might be easier to reframe "tax cuts" and "tax hikes" for
property taxes than for sales or income taxes. Hence, the mere fact that voters
appear to accept the operation of revenue-target baselines for local property
taxes, in and of itself, does not imply that voters would similarly accept these
baselines for statewide sales and income taxes.
The second relevant difference between local property taxes and state
sales and income taxes is that property values generally increase over time
while sales and income tax bases fluctuate far more wildly. As such, adopting a
revenue-target baseline for property taxes can be sold as preventing "automatic
tax hikes" due to increasing property values.237 Although the recent financial
236. Gary C. Cornia & Lawrence C. Walters, Full Disclosure: Unanticipated
Improvements in Property Tax Uniformity, 25 PuB. BUDGETING & FIN. 106, 110 (June 2005).

237. The advocates of the truth-in-taxation property tax measures viewed themselves as
promoting a softer version of a tax-expenditure limit with the purpose of reigning in the growth of
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crisis has seen a widespread decline in housing values, this development is still
too new and historically unique to have produced any significant calls for
reform.238
As a final difference, tax lawmaking relies on a very different set of
institutions and procedures at the local level than at the state level. While, even
a cursory discussion of these differences is beyond the scope of this Article,
any attempt to draw inferences from local governments' experiences with these
truth-in-taxation systems should be qualified with an understanding of the
differences between tax lawmaking at these two levels of governance.
2. Implementing an Alternative Baselinefor State Level Taxes

The local property tax context is sufficiently different from the context
surrounding statewide taxes that truth-in-taxation property tax measures cannot
provide clear guidance for implementing an alternative tax baseline at the state
level. Still, the successful implementation of these local property tax measures
is at least encouraging for this Article's project. At a minimum, these measures
indicate that analysts and policymakers appear to believe that baselines matter
for at least some forms of taxation and that it is sometimes possible to alter
these baselines.
Just as truth-in-taxation local property tax systems have been
implemented quite differently across the various states that have adopted these
measures, there are numerous possibilities for implementing revenue-target
baselines for state-level taxes. Perhaps the most straightforward method of
implementation would be to have an administrative agency adjust predesignated tax rates as the economy cycles. This could work in a similar
fashion to how the federal government and some states administratively adjust
their income tax brackets to account for inflation. As with these inflationadjustment systems, legislatures could always adjust steady-state brackets or
rates afterwards in order to generate any outcome desired. But in the absence of
specific legislative action, the administrative body could adjust tax rates so as
to keep revenues constant as the economy cycles.
Of course, the authorizing statutes would have to specify what it means to
hold revenues constant. As in the local property tax context, the revenue-target
baselines could be indexed for inflation, for GDP growth, or to a wide variety
of other possible indexing possibilities (including not indexing at all). The

local governments. See Bland & Laosirirat, supra note 228. This Article argues for revenue-target
baselines for statewide sales and income taxes in order to transfer some of the effects of fiscal
volatility from the public to the private sector, not to limit the growth of government.
Consequently, the political actors supporting revenue-target baselines for local property taxes
would not necessarily support these baselines for statewide sales and income taxes.
238. At the time of this writing, the truth-in-taxation property tax systems remain intact,
and to this author's knowledge there have not yet been any significant political moves to abolish
them.
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authorizing statues would also have to specify which taxes the administrative
agency is to adjust as the economy cycles. The agency might adjust all
statewide taxes equally to keep total general account revenues constant, or it
could adjust a specific subset of statewide taxes. Any subset of state taxes could
be adjusted by enough to keep total state revenues constant.239 For example, an
authorizing statute could create a new statewide property tax with a steady-state
rate of zero, charging an administrative agency to oscillate the new tax rate as
the economy cycles to impose a tax liability during downturns and to give a
credit against existing taxes during upturns. During periods of growth, this tax
could be gradually reduced (or made into a gradually larger credit) to
counteract the additional revenues generated by other state taxes, with the
opposite occurring during downturns.
One obvious concern about having administrative officials adjust tax rates
in this fashion is that this might delegate too much authority to the
administrative officials. Yet state administrative officials (or legislative staffs in
some states) already enjoy most of the discretionary powers that a delegation of
this sort would entail.
With tax rates set as the baseline for statewide taxes, states require
estimates for the revenues that these taxes will generate. These estimates are
crucial due to state balanced-budget requirements, as the estimates determine
what levels of spending are permissible. If the administrative or legislative
staffs charged with making revenue estimates report that less revenue is
available, legislatures must either cut spending or raise taxes.
On the other hand, if states adopted revenue targets as their baselines for
state taxes in place of tax rates, they would need estimates for the tax rates
required to generate the revenue targets. This form of estimating would replace
the current need to estimate revenues based on legislatively set tax rates. Under
either system, calculations made by administrative officials significantly impact
fiscal policy outcomes. Hence, the distinctive feature of this Article's proposal
is not that it relies on estimates, or that forecasting officials have substantial
control over fiscal policy, but rather that revenue targets replace tax rates as the
independent variable in the estimating equation.240
239. Note that if a progressive-rate income tax (as opposed to a flat-rate income tax) is to
be adjusted, the authorizing statute must specify which rates are to be adjusted as the economy
cycles. As with indexing and other design variables, any answer to this question must be
somewhat arbitrary. There is no theoretically "correct" method for adjusting the rates of a
progressive income tax. One possible approach would be to attempt to adjust the rates so as to
make the tax adjustments distributionally neutral. But this is not the only possibility, and a
normative argument can be made in favor of adjusting the rates so that high-income taxpayers
bear more of the tax burden during downturns and less during upturns. See supra notes 168-73
and accompanying text.
240. We currently label this forecasting as the revenue estimating process because we use
tax rates as our baseline. With revenue targets as the baseline, the process would be labeled as taxrate estimating. Under either system, calculations made by administrative officials significantly
impact fiscal policy outcomes.
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Still, projecting revenue from the starting point of tax rates might be
considered more straightforward than projecting tax rates from the starting
point of revenue targets. State income taxes are only collected annually, and
even sales tax rates must be announced well in advance of the date they take
effect. At some point, the tax rates must be fixed for the year. To the extent the
economy changes after setting the tax rates, or to the extent that a set of
projections proves inaccurate, a state might not collect the amount of revenue
requested. Revenue targets are merely targets, after all.
In the short term, states may not actually raise the amount of money
demanded. Yet this problem is easily resolved within the context of a multiyear timeframe. If a state experiences a revenue shortfall in a year, the default
tax rates for the subsequent year can be adjusted to make up for the shortfall.
Instead of looking only to the current year's revenue targets when setting tax
rates, the forecasting agency could factor any shortfall or surplus from the
previous year into the amount of revenue requested. The agency would then
estimate the tax rates needed to raise the combined revenue target. These tax
rates would become the default policy outcome for the year. If state or local
policymakers wish to raise or lower the level of taxes to be collected, they
would simply adjust the revenue targets causing the forecasting agency to
recalculate the tax rates based on the new amount of revenue requested. Over a
longer timeframe, states must still either project revenue from the baseline of
tax rates or project tax rates from the baseline of revenue targets. Both systems
require significant delegation to administrative agencies or other forecasting
staffs.
On a related note, this Article previously argued that a significant obstacle
to the adequate financing of rainy-day funds is the unreliability of economic
forecasts. 24 1 A skeptical reader might question whether unreliable forecasting
can really prevent states from fully relying on rainy-day funds as a first-best
solution to fiscal volatility, without preventing states from adopting an
alternative baseline. However, estimating the proper size of rainy-day funds
requires the state to make predictions across entire economic cycles,
forecasting at least six to eight years ahead. Conversely, adopting an alternative
baseline only requires forecasting estimates for a year into the future. If we
were to charge an administrative agency with the power to mandate full
financing of rainy-day funds, the agency would need to predict how long each
boom and bust would last and how much of current economic activity is a
result of volatility around the steady state as opposed to trends in steady-state
growth. In contrast, estimating what tax rates are needed to meet revenue
targets only requires projections for the condition of the economy a year or so
in advance of the estimation. Moreover, any errors are easily remedied by
adjusting the following period's tax rates to compensate. Forecasting
241.

See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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unreliability poses a much greater problem for the adequate financing of rainyday funds than for adopting a revenue-targets baseline.242
So far, our discussion has focused on the issues that arise in implementing
a revenue-targets baseline. Implementing a spending-needs baseline raises near
identical concerns. However, it is useful here to distinguish between a partial
spending-needs baseline and a complete spending-needs baseline. A partial
spending-needs baseline works essentially like a revenue-targets baseline,
except that the revenue targets are further adjusted based on metrics for
program needs. For instance, the administrative agency might start with a
baseline of holding revenues constant, perhaps indexed for inflation or GDP
growth, but then adjust the baseline to meet the funding needs of
countercyclical entitlement programs like Medicaid. As additional beneficiaries
qualify for Medicaid in a downturn, the agency would adjust the baseline so as
to automatically allocate revenues to fund these additional beneficiaries. After
adjusting the baseline as appropriate, the agency would then set tax rates so as
to keep discretionary revenues constant after adjusting for any changes in the
funding needs of entitlement spending programs.
In contrast to this partial spending-needs approach, a complete spendingneeds system would set tax rates to fund legislative spending authorizations,
instead of the revenue targets being calculated independently of spending.
Under this approach, balanced-budget constraints would have no independent
force. Legislatures would only deliberate directly on spending, with taxes being
calculated based on the revenue needed to fund the authorized spending.
Although the complete spending-needs system is a plausible means of
adopting an alternative baseline, it is discussed here mostly to highlight its
differences from a partial spending-needs system and from a revenue-target
system. Under the two latter systems, balanced-budget constraints continue to
exert independent force. Legislatures cannot simply increase spending and then
rely on the rate-setting agency to fund this spending. Instead, if legislatures
want to increase spending under either of these systems, they must explicitly
raise taxes by increasing the revenue target. All these systems change the
mechanism through which legislatures raise and lower taxes from adjusting tax
rates to adjusting the revenue targets. But neither revenue-targets baselines nor
partial spending-needs baselines relieve legislatures of the need to set the level
of taxation and to conform spending to revenues generated by the chosen tax
levels.
Both spending-needs baselines and revenue-targets baselines are intended
only to change how states respond to fiscal volatility, not to alter the evolution
of steady-state policies. Nevertheless, adopting either baseline would have the

242. Additionally, the main obstacle to full financing of rainy-day funds remains the ability
of the dominant political coalition to raid these funds either explicitly or through the use of
gimmicks.
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side effect of altering the default policy response to changes in long-term
economic growth rates. With tax rates as a baseline, the default policy response
to improving long-term growth trends is increased revenues, and the default
response to worsening growth trends is reduced revenues. Under the alternative
baselines, revenues would remain constant while tax rates would increase or
decrease, respectively.
This Article's arguments for why tax rates should absorb the majority of
fiscal volatility do not apply to changing long-term growth trends. But neither
is there any particular reason to think that the default response to changing
long-term growth trends should be changes to future revenues as opposed to
future tax rates. Which default response we prefer depends on the metric we
wish to use to evaluate the future size of government. Yet both metrics are
incomplete; to rationally determine preferences for the future size of
government in the face of changing growth trends, we would need information
about both the burden taxes impose on the economy (related to tax rates) and
about the cost of funding the public spending we desire (related to revenues).
By definition, an unexpected change in long-term growth trends means that we
cannot have accurate information about both future tax rates and future
revenues, because changing growth trends alter the relationship between tax
rates levied and revenues generated.
As neither existing tax-rates baselines nor the alternative baselines
discussed in this Article offer any clear advantages for responding to changing
long-term growth trends, we should choose the baseline that best responds to
short-term fiscal volatility. Both revenue-targets and spending-needs baselines
are better options than tax-rates baselines. States have numerous design options
for how to construct an alternative baseline. But the details of implementation
decisions should not distract from the overriding concern of improving how
states manage the fiscal volatility problem.
CONCLUSION

As this Article goes to press, states are facing yet another round of budget
crises as a result of the ongoing recession. 24 3 Predictably, states have begun
slashing funding for a variety of spending programs.244 State budget problems
tend to lag behind declining economic conditions, and states have a history of
using rainy-day funds and budgetary gimmicks to muddle through the early
parts of a downturn.245 As such, we do not yet have the data needed to analyze
state responses to the recent recession. Still, if history is a guide, state budget
conditions will continue to deteriorate even as the overall economy improves.
ELIZABETH McNICHOL & IRIS J. LAV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, NEW
243.
FISCAL YEAR BRINGS No RELIEF FROM UNPRECEDENTED STATE BUDGET PROBLEMS (2009),

http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=711.
244. Id. at 4.
245.

FRAMING THE CHOICES, supra note 37, at 5-6.
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As the current recession appears dramatically more severe than recent analogs,
there is reason to fear the worst.246
Current trends suggest that fiscal volatility will become an increasingly
pressing problem over the coming decades. 24 7 States will eventually recover
from their current crises, but even more dire future crises wait just around the
comer. This Article has argued that the risk and uncertainty produced by fiscal
volatility dramatically undermines the effectiveness of state spending
programs. Unless states proactively develop a framework for managing fiscal
volatility, increasingly severe revenue fluctuations threaten to devastate the
vitality of the states' public sectors.
This Article has proposed one potential solution for managing the fiscal
volatility problem. Undoubtedly, future papers will explore alternative
approaches.248 Nevertheless, this round of state budget crises presents an
opportunity that should not be ignored. As states reevaluate their fiscal
structures, they should consider long-term approaches for managing fiscal
volatility. An effective discussion of these issues must begin with riskallocation theory, and should include a discussion of budgetary baselines.
Hopefully, this Article will begin a dialogue about the roles that risk
allocation and budgetary baselines might play in forging a better structure for
managing fiscal volatility. As the saying goes, "a crisis is a terrible thing to
waste."249

246.

See McNIcHoL & LAV, supra note 243, at 3.

247.

See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.

248. For a discussion of alternative solutions for the state of California, see David Gamage,
Coping Through California's Budget Crises in Light of Proposition 13 and Cahfornia's Fiscal
Constitution, in AFTER THE TAX REVOLT: PROPOSITION 13 TURNS 30 59-65 (Jack Citrin & Isaac
William Martin eds., 2009).

249. Freakonomics Blog, http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/ (Aug. 13,
2009, 12:27 EST) ("no crisis should go to waste").
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